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Toward a “Tender Offer” Market for Labor Representation
Aneil Kovvali* & Jonathan R. Macey**
American workers are not sharing in the robust growth of the
economy. Traditionally, large numbers of workers sought to
improve their lot by bargaining collectively through unions. But
the strategy does not seem to be working for enough workers.
Despite some renewed recent activity, private sector unionization
rates remain below 10%, and the unions that are in place have
struggled to perform well, either in avoiding scandals or in
delivering significant returns to workers in the form of job
security or wage growth. This Article proposes a radical fix to the
problem of declining unions. Drawing inspiration from corporate
governance and its success in delivering financial returns to
shareholders, the Article proposes allowing pro-worker investors
to offer workers cash upfront for the right to represent them. If
an investor succeeds in persuading a majority of workers in a
workplace, the investor would be certified as the exclusive
bargaining representative for the workers, and would be entitled
to a percentage of any wage gains it obtained for the workers
through collective bargaining. The resulting market for union
representation would deliver cash to workers upfront, allow
investors to demonstrate their capacity for delivering concrete
results to workers, and attract resources to the cause of improving
workers’ conditions of employment.
The proposal’s new
methodological approach also provides a lens for a constructive
reevaluation of the objectives and tactics of American labor law.
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Introduction
For decades, corporate America has succeeded delivering ever higher profits
for shareholders by squeezing workers. 1 Whether the basic driver is labor
monopsony,2 or a lack of worker power to capture economic profits at corporations, 3
or increasingly ruthless business and legal practices, 4 there appears to be a
fundamental power imbalance between workers and the providers of financial
capital.5 The result has been rich financial returns and stratospheric stock prices
for shareholders, and increased economic and personal misery for workers. 6
Labor unions are supposed to be the answer to these problems. Instead of
having to bargain with an employer on her own, a worker can engage in concerted
action with other workers. The labor union is an organizational form intended to
exercise that collective power.7 If a sufficient number of workers in a workplace
petition for it, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) will schedule an
election.8 A majority of workers can then cast votes that determine whether a union
will be certified as their representative.9 If the union is certified, it can advocate for
E.g., Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis:
An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy, Brookings Papers on Econ.
Activity (2020).
2
E.g., Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power,
132 Harv. L. Rev. 536 (2018) (discussing labor market monopsony and potential remedies under
antitrust law); Zohar Goshen & Doron Levit, Common Ownership and the Decline of the American
Worker, Colum. L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 653 (2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3832069 (suggesting that common ownership by
large institutional investors may suppress investments that would boost employment, having effects
comparable to labor monopsony).
3
Stansbury & Summers, supra note __ at __.
4
David Weil, The Fissured Workplace (2014).
5
Steven Greenhouse, New Poll: Americans See Big Power Imbalance in the Workplace, On
Labor: Workers, Unions, Politics (May 14 2020), https://onlabor.org/new-poll-americans-see-bigpower-imbalance-in-the-workplace/ (“69 percent of likely American voters said workers have too little
power, a view shared by over three-quarters of Democrats and nearly six in ten Republicans. The
survey also found that 64 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that “on the whole,
employers have too much power over workers,” including more than three quarters of Democrats and
more than half of Republicans.”).
6
Henry Blodget, Profits Just Hit Another All-Time High, Wages Just Hit Another All-Time
Low, Business Insider (Apr. 11, 2013), https://www.businessinsider.com/profits-at-high-wages-at-low2013-4 (corporate profits hit an all-time high, while wages as a percent of the economy just hit
another all-time low).
7
Susan Dynarsky, Fresh Proof That Strong Unions Help Reduce Income Inequality, The N.Y.
Times (July 6, 2018), https://www.osaunion.org/news/aug18/unionsinequality.pdf
8
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 607 (1969) (if employer does not voluntarily
recognize union, union must have support of 30% of workers to trigger election); 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c)(1)(A) (union can trigger election upon showing that “substantial number of employees . . .
wish to be represented”).
9
National Labor Relations Board, Your Right to Form a Union, https://www.nlrb.gov/aboutnlrb/rights-we-protect/the-law/employees/your-right-to-form-a-union.
1
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worker interests, and the employer must bargain with it in good faith. 10 By acting
collectively through unions, workers are supposed to be able to demand higher
wages and better working conditions.11
But the once-mighty American labor movement is in disarray. Only about
6% of private sector workers in the United States belong to a union. 12 This
diminished scale is a profound impediment to unions’ ability to improve outcomes.
Employers are free to replace workers who strike to obtain economic benefits, so a
union that represents only a handful of workers in the relevant labor market has
little leverage.13 Employers are also reluctant to make concessions that would put
them at a competitive disadvantage, so a union will make little headway in
negotiations with an employer unless it can credibly promise that it will force the
same terms on the employer’s competitors. 14 And scale is necessary for effective
advocacy in the political arena. As a result, the diminished size and influence of

Union certification is the determination by the National Labor Relations Board or a state agency
that a particular union qualifies as the bargaining unit for a company’s or an industry’s workers
because it has the support of a majority of the workers. It is also termed as certification of
bargaining agent. https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/union-certification/.
10
29 U.S.C §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (describing employer and union’s mutual obligation to
bargain collectively in good faith); National Labor Relations Board, Collective Bargaining, (Section
8(d) & 8(b)(3)), https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/the-law/collective-bargainingsection-8d-8b3 (“A union must bargain in good faith on behalf of employees it represents, and it is
unlawful for a union to fail to do so. Examples of failing to do so include insisting to impasse on a
nonmandatory subject of bargaining, or reaching a collective-bargaining agreement with an
employer but then refusing to sign it.”).
11
Dynarsky, supra note __; Henry S. Farber, Daniel Herbst, Ilyana Kuziemko & Suresh Naidu,
Unions and Inequality over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data, Nat’l Bur. Econ.
Research (rev. May 2021), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w24587/w24587.pdf
(U.S. income inequality has varied inversely with union density over the past 100 years).
12
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members Summary (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm#:~:text=The%20unionization%20rate%20for%20pri
vate,drop%20in%20private%2D%20sector%20employment (reporting that the “union membership
rate of public-sector workers (34.8 percent) continued to be more than five times higher than the rate
of private-sector workers (6.3 percent)”).
13
See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938); National Labor
Relations Board, The Right to Strike, https://www.nlrb.gov/strikes (“If the object of a strike is to
obtain from the employer some economic concession such as higher wages, shorter hours, or better
working conditions, the striking employees are called economic strikers. They retain their status as
employees and cannot be discharged, but they can be replaced by their employer.”).
14
E.g., Samuel Estreicher, “Think Global, Act Local”: Employee Representation in a World of
Global Labor and Product Market Competition, 4 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 81, 87 (2009) (“The theory
underlying labor's traditional objectives was that, although unionism did indeed create additional
costs that outweighed productivity gains for firms, these costs need not have harmed the competitive
position of unionized firms. This assumes that these increased costs could be imposed on all
competitors operating in the same product market, through a combination of industry pacts,
extension laws, and immigration and tariff barriers.”).
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unions translates directly into a diminished capacity to drive better outcomes for
workers.
The power imbalance between workers and capital seems unlikely to change
without significant reforms to the process. One major problem is that labor unions
appear to lack credibility with American workers. Academics view unions as
glamorous. Many workers do not. For example, a recent high-profile drive to
unionize Amazon employees in Bessemer, Alabama, a cradle of the American labor
movement, resulted in an embarrassing defeat after a lopsided majority of workers
voted to reject the union.15 While there have been some recent small-scale victories,
including at a Starbucks in Buffalo,16 it remains to be seen whether the small
number of workers affected will continue to support their union in the face of likely
setbacks and disappointments.17
Unionized workers do not seem particularly enthusiastic. In a recent bright
spot for American labor, workers at John Deere went on strike and forced the

Noam Scheiber, Union Loss May Bring New Phase of Campaign Against Amazon, N.Y. Times
(Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/09/business/economy/amazon-labor-unions.html
(describing “lopsided vote” against union at Amazon warehouse, and highlighting persistent
headwinds to unionization). The NLRB has found that Amazon violated labor law in the election
and ordered a second election, but it is not clear that the underlying dynamics have changed.
Sebastian Herrera, Amazon Union Push Faces Hurdle as Many Workers Leave Too Quickly to
Organize, Wall St. J. (Dec. 29, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-turnover-presentsorganizing-challenge-for-expected-alabama-election-11640775602 (noting that 71% of workers voted
against the union in the first election, and that various unfavorable dynamics have continued or
intensified). But see Noam Scheiber & Karen Weise, Amazon Warehouse in Alabama is Set to Begin
Second Union Election, N.Y. Times (Feb. 4, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/04/business/amazon-alabama-union-election.html (noting that
some unfavorable dynamics such as high turnover remain in place, but suggesting that “the
circumstances of the second election do appear to differ from those of the first election in some key
respects”); Sebastian Herrera, Amazon Workers at Alabama Facility Poised to Vote a Second Time on
Union Bid, Wall St. J. (Feb. 2, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-workers-at-alabamafacility-poised-to-vote-a-second-time-on-union-bid-11643797809 (same).
16
E.g. Noam Scheiber, Starbucks workers at a Buffalo store unionize in a big symbolic win for
labor, N.Y. Times (Dec. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/09/business/economy/buffalostarbucks-union.html.
17
This is not to slight the efforts to unionize Starbucks locations, but merely to point out that
there remain substantial obstacles between a union achieving certification and achieving stability by
delivering better outcomes for their workers. E.g. Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace 111
(1990) (noting that an employer that fails to prevent a union from winning a certification election
can “simply carry on its resistance at the next stage by stonewalling at the bargaining table, forcing
the union members out on strike, and hiring permanent replacements to fill their jobs”); Paul Weiler,
Striking New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 351, 352 (1984) (observing that an employer can prevent a new union from fully establishing
itself by preventing the union from successfully negotiating a first contract).
15
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company to improve wages and other conditions.18 But the result belied the
enormous distrust of unions revealed along the way. The striking workers twice
rejected the deals that the United Autoworkers (“UAW”) union had negotiated on
their behalf before finally accepting the third contract presented to them. Striking
workers denounced their union representatives to the media throughout the
process, dismissing them as out of touch, corrupt, overly defensive, and eager to
stifle dissent.19 The UAW faced similar issues during a strike at a Volvo plant in
Virginia, where workers refused to ratify three consecutive contracts before finally
ratifying the third contract on a repeat vote. 20 And the issues are not limited to the
UAW. Striking workers at four Kellogg plants overwhelmingly rejected a contract
negotiated by their union, the Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers and Grain
Millers International Union,21 before finally accepting a deal that ended the strike.
While Americans seem to approve of unions in the abstract, 22 they appear deeply
skeptical about trusting unions to make decisions about their own livelihoods, and
with some justification.23

JeAnne Whalen, John Deere Factory Workers Approve New Contract, Ending Historic Strike,
The Washington Post (Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2021/11/17/deerestrike-contract-vote/.
19
Stephen Rodrick, ‘A Way of Life Is At Stake.’ Striking John Deere Workers Defy the
Company, and Their Union, to Tell Their Stories, Rolling Stone (Nov. 5, 2021),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/john-deere-strike-american-labor-uprising1252205/; Noam Scheiber, Union for John Deere Workers Reaches Tentative Deal to End 2-Week
Strike, N.Y. Times (Nov. 3, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/30/business/john-deere-workersstrike.html; Noam Scheiber, John Deere Workers Strike in Contract Dispute, N.Y. Times (Oct. 14,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/14/business/economy/john-deere-strike.html; see also Liz
Skeen, Only Democracy Can Save One of America’s Greatest Unions, The Nation (Nov. 18, 2021),
https://www.thenation.com/article/society/uaw-elections-union-democracy/.
20
UAW, UAW Volvo Mack Truck Members in Dublin Virginia Vote, Overall & Hourly
Agreements Ratify, Salary Contract Voted Down; Strike Will End (July 14, 2021),
https://uaw.org/uaw-volvo-mack-truck-members-dublin-virginia-vote-overall-strike-will-end/.
21
Noam Scheiber, Kellogg Workers Prolong Strike by Rejecting Contract Proposal (Dec. 7,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/07/business/kellogg-workers-strike.html.
22
Megan Brenan, Approval of Labor Unions at Highest Point Since 1965, Gallup (Sep. 2, 2021),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/354455/approval-labor-unions-highest-point-1965.aspx (reporting poll
results showing that unions have a 68% approval rating among Americans).
23
Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Costs, Corporate Governance, and the American Labor Union, 38
Yale J. on Reg. 311 (2021); cf. Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union
Representation, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2008) (noting that workers may struggle to evaluate union
performance, making it difficult to evaluate the credibility of union claims without more information
than a representation campaign might elicit). This is not ill-founded. For example, the UAW has
been embroiled in a corruption scandal that included misappropriation of union funds and bribes to
union officials from employers. See, e.g., Skeen, supra note __; Consent Decree, United States v. Int’l
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., 2:20-cv-13293DML-RSW, Dkt. No. 10 (Jan. 29, 2021) (“The defendant union acknowledges that there have been
criminal convictions, allegations, sworn testimony, and judicial findings of past problems with fraud,
18
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Resources are also a meaningful constraint. As matters stand, unions must
make difficult and contentious decisions about how best to allocate scarce financial
capital.24 The funds available for organizing are limited, and place unions at a
disadvantage vis-à-vis employers. The largest labor federation, the AFL-CIO, had
total spending of $123 million in the fiscal year ending in 2019; of this, less than
10% was dedicated to organizing.25 By contrast, employers spend $340 million per
year on union avoidance consultants. 26 Given that employers already have powerful
tools at their disposal to frustrate organizing, including the ability to restructure
their operations or to require workers to attend meetings to hear anti-union
messages, the disparity in financial resources is an important constraint.
A broad range of solutions have been proposed, but they generally only
address part of the problem. For example, policymakers have suggested reforms
that would make it easier for unions to win certification elections, including by
eliminating various advantages enjoyed by hostile employers.27 But such measures
would neither increase unions’ credibility with workers nor increase the resources
available for organizing. Others have suggested reforms to internal union
processes28 or new models for competition between unions.29 While these measures
could increase the credibility of workers’ representatives, they would not increase
available resources. A final model of reform would seek to empower workers
directly by having government mandate terms for employment and increasing
government benefits.30 But while this approach has promise, it would only have a
limited impact on workers’ ability to bargain collectively, and mandatory universal
terms cannot provide the full set of benefits potentially available from agreements
customized to the status of particular firms and employees. The existing proposals
corruption, and criminal conduct by certain officials within the UAW and certain of its related
entities.”).
24
For example, conflicts over spending priorities were a major cause of disputes between the
AFL-CIO and the Change to Win Coalition, with the AFL-CIO prioritizing political lobbying and the
Change to Win Coalition prioritizing new organizing efforts. See, e.g., Keith J. Gross, Separate to
Unite: Will Change to Win Strengthen Organized Labor in America?, 24 Buff. Pub. Int. L. J. 75, 10001 (2006); Noam Scheiber, After Trumka’s Death, A.F.L.-C.I.O. Faces a Crossroads, N.Y. Times (Aug.
8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/08/business/economy/afl-cio-labor-unions-trumka.html
(describing conflict between labor leaders who focus on political efforts and support for local unions
and labor leaders who focus on building the labor movement and organizing additional workers).
25
Hamilton Nolan, AFL-CIO Budget Is a Stark Illustration of the Decline of Organizing,
Splinter (May 16, 2019), https://splinternews.com/afl-cio-budget-is-a-stark-illustration-of-the-declineo-1834793722.
26
Gordon Lafer & Lola Loustaunau, Fear at Work: An inside account of how employers
threaten, intimidate, and harass workers to stop them from exercising their right to collective
bargaining, Economic Policy Institute 5-6 (July 23, 2020), https://files.epi.org/pdf/202305.pdf.
27
See infra Part I.A.
28
See infra Part I.A, I.B.
29
See infra Part I.B.
30
See infra Part I.C.
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thus do not solve the problem of ensuring vigorous, effective, and well-resourced
collective action on behalf of workers by well-motivated representatives. 31
But the basic problem has already been solved, at least for shareholders and
corporations. Much like workers, shareholders have much to gain from successfully
overcoming the collective action problems that they face, 32 and much like workers,
shareholders have much to lose if their collective representatives fail to advance
their interests.
Corporate law and the market for corporate control largely solved
shareholders’ agency problem, with the result that shareholders have enjoyed
outsized returns — and an enormous advantage in dealing with their dispersed
counterparties in labor. This suggests the potential for a “policy arbitrage,” in
which mechanisms and innovations that have made corporate governance
successful for shareholders are imported into the market for human capital in order
to make labor law better serve the interests of workers, on whose behalf the unions
exist in the first place.33
This Article draws inspiration from the market for corporate control. 34 It is
well known that if corporate officers and directors fail to deliver adequate returns to

This problem in general is the well-known agency problem which is that unions often
underperform in carrying out their responsibilities as agents of their principals, the workers. Work
by Eugene Fama, Michael Jensen, and William Meckling made the agency problem the dominant
paradigm for understanding, evaluating, and improving corporate law. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama,
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael
C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & Econ. 301 (1983); Michael Jensen &
William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
4 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). For an influential critical account of this paradigm, see Margaret M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247 (1999).
32
Cf. Stephen F. Befort & John W. Budd, Invisible Hands, Invisible Objectives: Bringing
Workplace Law and Public Policy into Focus 32 (2009) (noting that stockholders unite in
corporations and select common representatives to attend to their collective interests much as
workers seek to do through unions); Sanjukta Paul, Fissuring and the Firm Exemption, 82 L. &
Contem. Probs. 65 (2019) (noting that antitrust law has evolved to permit stockholders to coordinate
economic activities through firms, while reflecting continued skepticism of workers’ attempts to
coordinate).
33
Macey, supra note __ at 315; cf. Hiba Hafiz, Labor’s Antitrust Paradox, 86 U. Chi. L. Rev.
381, 383 (2019) (proposing “regulatory sharing” between labor law and antitrust).
34
The market for corporate control is also known as the takeover market. Corporate takeovers
present a unique opportunity to ameliorate the agency costs that exist between shareholders and
managers. James F. Cotter & Marc Zenner, How Managerial Wealth Affects the Tender Offer
Process, 35 J. Fin. Econ. 63, 64 (1994). The proposal we make in this Article similarly provides a
unique opportunity to ameliorate the agency problems that exist between unions and workers. The
mechanism we propose also has a resemblance to corporate vote-buying, in which a stockholder
agrees to vote their shares in a specific way in exchange for some consideration. But it differs in that
the investor would also be acquiring a meaningful economic stake in the workers’ wages. For a
broader discussion of vote-buying, see infra notes __ to __ and accompanying text.
31
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shareholders, an outside investor can make an offer to buy shares directly from the
shareholders. If enough shareholders tender their shares, the outside investor will
gain bargaining power over management and can wield the collective power of
shareholders to manage the company better. To prevail, the investor must offer
more than the current market price of the shares because without such a premium,
shareholders would have no reason to tender. And to earn a return on the purchase
of its shares, the outside investor must be able to manage the company in a way
that increases returns even above the returns associated with the tender offer
premium. While managers now have powerful tools to flummox a hostile tender
offer,35 it remains an important disciplining force. 36 Even managers who are not
the subject of a takeover are acutely aware that if they fail to deliver returns to
shareholders an outside investor could emerge to wrest away control. As such, the
manager of any public company with sufficiently broad shareholder dispersion are
under constant threat of replacement.
A similar market mechanism could revitalize labor organizing. 37 If there is a
lot of room for improvement in workers’ wages, an entrepreneurial outside investor
could offer to pay workers for their votes in a certification election. Put another
way, under our proposal the law would be changed to allow investors to pay for the
right to represent workers in exchange for the right to bargain on their behalf. If a
majority of workers agree, an investor should be able to wield the collective power of
the workers by being certified as the workers’ exclusive bargaining representative.
Of course the outside investor requires a return on its payment to the workers, and
this return would come in the form of a percentage of any wage increase it secured.
To prevail, the investor would have to make a meaningful offer, putting cash in the
pockets of workers immediately. Such a payment would send a strong signal of the
wage increases it believes it can generate. And to profit, the investor would have to
proceed to negotiate a meaningful wage increase for workers.
The new market would bring significant new resources and scale to the task
of organizing workplaces.38 Traditional labor unions would be armed with new tools
to organize workplaces and attract investment. And a broad range of new players
— including private equity funds and other sophisticated investors, drawing on the
skillsets of activist investors and litigation financiers — could invest in the space.

Delaware law gives corporate directors and officers the ability to deploy takeover defenses if
a takeover poses a threat. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(approving board’s use of takeover defenses in light of the “threat” that shareholders would accept a
tender offer at an inadequate price).
36
A board’s decision to defend against a tender offer is subject to “exacting judicial scrutiny by
a judge who will evaluate the actions taken by, and the motives of, the board.” Id. at 54.
37
See infra Part II.
38
See infra Part III.
35
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Each would have a financial incentive to identify workplaces where workers are
underpaid, intervene, and drive wages up. The mechanism would also create new
competition and accountability for traditional unions by giving workers in all
companies a sense of how much traditional collective bargaining should be able to
deliver.
Exploring the mechanism can also shed light on broader issues. 39 Corporate
experience could be a rich source of ideas for labor law reforms. But corporate ideas
also serve as a useful provocation. Corporate governance was successful in
delivering financial returns to shareholders in part because its objective was
consciously narrowed to focus exclusively on delivering financial returns to
shareholders.40 We recognize that focusing labor law on the narrow goal of
delivering wage increases is likely to be controversial for two reasons. First, our
approach might be seen as diminishing the significance of non-wage issues such as
working conditions and worker safety. As we note below, policymakers concerned
about these issues could adopt tailored modifications to incentivize an investor to
address these issues.41 More fundamentally, such concerns are best addressed
through vigorous regulation and enforcement under statutes like the Occupational
Safety and Health Act.42 Relying on unions with limited coverage and capacity to
negotiate improvements is unlikely to be the best course. Second, our approach
does not address the political and social dimensions of labor organizing in the way
that traditional union organizing was arguably supposed to do. We realize that this
is a significant step.43 But the current state of wages, income disparities, and
American labor unions demands a reconsideration of traditional approaches to
improving the lot of the American worker.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses prior proposals to improve
the lot of American workers and the functioning of labor unions. Part II turns to
our proposal for a takeover market for union representation, explaining its key
components and defending our design choices. Part III evaluates the plausibility of

See infra Part IV.
E.g. Daniel L. Greenwald, Martin Lettau & Sydney C. Ludvigson, How the Wealth Was Won:
Factors Shares as Market Fundamentals, NBER Working Paper No. 25769 (rev. Apr. 2021),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25769/w25769.pdf (finding that 44% of the
increase in American equity values from 1989 to 2017 is attributable to the reallocation of rewards
from stakeholders like workers to stockholders).
41
See infra Part II.B.2.
42
See Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Workers’ Rights,
https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/publications/osha3021.pdf; Aneil Kovvali, Essential
Businesses and Shareholder Value, 2021 U. Chi. Legal F. 191, 205-07 (noting the value of universally
applicable government regulations on worker safety issues, but highlighting systemic weaknesses of
government responses).
43
For a broader discussion of this set of concerns, see infra Part IV.A.
39
40

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4038439

Boston College Law Review (Forthcoming)

11

the proposal, addressing the structure’s potential scope and feasibility. Part IV
considers broader implications.
I.

Prior Proposals

The struggles of workers and labor unions have prompted various reform
proposals. These include (a) proposals to improve union-related processes, with the
goal of making it easier for unions to win certification elections and represent
workplaces; (b) proposals to encourage competition between different unions and
between different models of organizing, with the goal of prompting innovation and
improvements; and (c) proposals to empower workers directly, with the goal of
improving their lot and reducing the demands placed on collective bargaining.
Many of the prior proposals have significant merit, and some inform
particular facets of our own proposal. But these prior proposals are unlikely to
solve the full problem. Despite enormous worker suffering, unions represent only a
small fraction of workplaces and often appear unable to attract broad worker
support even in high-profile campaigns. To be successful, a reform must improve
the credibility of worker representation, both by creating good incentives for
workers’ representatives and by allowing them to send powerful signals of their
value to workers in non-unionized workplaces. Reforms should also address the gap
in resources between the representatives of labor and capital. Prior proposals have
fallen short along these dimensions.
A.

Improving Union-Related Processes

There have been various proposals intended to improve unions’ ability to
prevail in certification campaigns. Academic proposals are legion. 44 There have
also been meaningful legislative and executive efforts. Among other changes, the
Employee Free Choice Act would allow unions to avoid an election by collecting
signed cards from a majority of workers, and would enhance enforcement of legal
protections for organizing campaigns.45 The Protecting the Right to Organize Act
(“PRO Act”) includes provisions that would bar employers from requiring workers to
For example, Professor Paul Weiler proposed a system of “instant elections” in which a union
could trigger an immediate representation election upon showing some threshold level of support,
thus eliminating opportunities for employer interference. Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra
note __ at 253-61; Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1769, 1804-22 (1983). In a proposal that would combine ease of
securing union representation with the benefits of enhanced competition, see infra Part I.B.2,
Professor Samuel Estreicher has proposed transitioning from the current “hard in, hard out” system
in which it is difficult for unions to gain representation rights and difficult for workers to dislodge
them to a new “easy in, easy out” system in which elections are held automatically and workers can
readily make changes. Samuel Estreicher, “Easy In, Easy Out”: A Future for U.S. Workplace
Representation, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 1615, 1628-30 (2014).
45
E.g. Employee Free Choice Act, S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009).
44
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attend meetings that discourage union membership, establish penalties for
interference with union organizing efforts, and end state right to work laws that
allow employees represented by a union to opt out of joining or paying dues. 46 In an
early memorandum setting out her priorities, Biden Administration NLRB General
Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo suggested an array of potential changes that could be
pursued administratively, including requiring an employer to recognize and bargain
with a union even without an election unless the employer has a good faith reason
for doubting that the union has majority support. 47 But while these measures may
provide real benefits, they would do little to address key problems driving the
decline in unionization. Specifically, they would not directly increase union
credibility, and would do little to increase the resources immediately available to
support organizing.
Policymakers could address credibility issues with procedural and
governance reforms inspired by corporate and securities law. In prior work, one of
us has proposed reforming union governance with a suite of policies drawn from
corporate experience: direct election of union leaders, using proxy advisory firms to
give workers high quality advice, updating disclosures to focus on potential union
corruption, empowering workers to make proposals, and requiring unions to have
independent directors.48 While these proposals would address agency problems
within unions, they would do little to address resource concerns, and do not tap a
particularly potent tool for demonstrating credibility to unorganized workers:
putting real money at stake.

Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2021, H.R. 842, 117th Cong. (2021); Protecting the
Right to Organize Act of 2019, H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. (2020).
47
Jennifer A. Abruzzo, Mandatory Submissions to Advice, NLRB Office of the General Counsel
Memorandum GC 21-04 (Aug. 12, 2021) at 7 (discussing Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263 (1949)).
For an earlier academic treatment of this proposal, see Brian J. Petruska, Adding Joy Silk to Labor’s
Reform Agenda, 57 Santa Clara L. Rev. 97 (2017).
48
Macey, supra note __. Other proposals on disclosure include Bodie, Information and the
Market for Union Representation, supra note __; Matthew T. Bodie, Mandatory Disclosure in the
Market for Union Representation, 5 Fla. Int’l Univ. L. Rev. 617 (2010); Estreicher, supra note __ at
523 (suggesting “a legal regime for all exclusive bargaining agencies and all organizations seeking
such authority to post at a designated place on the internet all collective agreements negotiated by
the organization in the particular industry, as well as a clear statement of the organization’s dues
structure and policy on seeking court-imposed fines”). Some of these concepts are beginning to be
put into practice. For example, in the wake of major scandals, the UAW voted to adopt a system of
direct elections. See United Autoworkers, UAW Statement on Election Referendum Results, UAW
(Dec. 2, 2021), https://uaw.org/uaw-statement-election-referendum-results/ (“Under the direction of
the Court-appointed Monitor, UAW members voting in the Referendum opted to change to the direct
election method of electing all International Executive Board members.”); Macey, supra note __ at
337-38 (describing the value of direct elections).
46
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Encouraging Competition

A different class of proposals has sought to tap the potential benefits of
competition, both between individual unions and between different models of
organizing. These concepts directly inspire the proposal here.
Several commentators have proposed removing barriers to competition
between unions, with the goal of boosting overall competence and credibility. 49
Important legal barriers prevent unions from competing with each other to
represent workplaces. Once a union has been certified, it cannot be challenged in
another election for one year.50 If the union reaches a collective bargaining
agreement with the employer, it can be shielded for three years, with challengers
afforded only a narrow window to trigger a competitive election. 51 These legal
barriers are exacerbated by union pacts and policies that prevent unions from
raiding each other for members.52
Competition spurs innovation and responsiveness, and the unions that
survived the process would likely be effective in satisfying worker demands. But
labor law’s traditional skepticism of competition does have some powerful
justifications. It would be difficult for a union to make headway in negotiations
with an employer if it was subject to continuous recall by referenda, and battles
between unions would drain resources from the battle against employers. 53 Given
that less than 10% of private-sector workplaces are unionized, competition between
existing unions is unlikely to drive meaningful improvements for workers.
A deeper set of proposals would encourage competition between models for
organizing. Across several articles, Professor Samuel Estreicher has proposed
loosening legal restrictions that inhibit experimentation with alternative forms of
Kye D. Pawlenko, Reevaluating Inter-Union Competition: A Proposal to Resurrect Rival
Unionism, 8 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 651 (2006) (suggesting end to no-raid pacts and other reforms
to increase competition between unions); Brian Petruska, Choosing Competition: A Proposal to
Modify Article XX of the AFL-CIO Constitution, 21 Hofstra Lab. & Empl. L. J. 1 (2005) (suggesting
end to no-raid provision in the AFL-CIO constitution); Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy,
supra note __ at 520 (suggesting loosening rules on rival bids to permit a more competitive market to
emerge).
50
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (“No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision
within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held.”).
51
“Under the [NLRB’s] current application of the contract-bar doctrine, a valid collectivebargaining agreement ordinarily is a bar to a representation petition during the term of the
agreement, but for no longer than 3 years. . . . During this ‘contract bar’ period, the [NLRB] will
dismiss all representation petitions unless they are filed during” a 30-day period prior to the
expiration date of the existing agreement. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 370 N.L.R.B. No. 110 (Apr. 21,
2021) (announcing NLRB decision to retain “contract-bar” doctrine after inviting briefing on whether
the doctrine should be overturned).
52
Petruska, supra note __ at __; Schwab, supra note __ at __.
53
Cf. Petruska, supra note __ at 25-27, 38-39.
49
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labor representation.54 One key element of this liberalization would be to permit
for-profit organizations to represent workers. 55 At present, antitrust laws exempt
only labor organizations “instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having
capital stock or conducted for profit.”56 A for-profit organization that attempted to
cartelize labor markets would thus be vulnerable under antitrust law. Loosening
the requirement would curb waste by exposing leaders to market discipline and
allowing leaders to deploy surplus cash flows productively.57 Such a reform would
be necessary in order to implement our proposal for a market for union control.
But proposals for for-profit unions have foundered on the issue of incentives.
As Dean Stewart Schwab has argued:
Workers would be reluctant to pay an organization whose
express goal is to maximize dues less services provided, the
difference going to outsiders, when they cannot easily
determine the quality of services provided. The incentive
would be strong for the bargaining-service firm’s
managers—whose fiduciary duties lie toward the
bargaining-service firm’s shareholders rather than to the
worker/consumers—to justify high dues with promises of
high-quality union services and then deliver something
less.58
Mapping the mechanics of for-profit corporate governance onto unions has also
proven difficult. Unlike shareholders, union members cannot transfer their interest
in the enterprise.59 As a result, potential insurgents cannot simply purchase a
Samuel Estreicher, “Easy In, Easy Out”: A Future for U.S. Workplace Representation, 98
Minn. L. Rev. 1615, 1635-36 (2014) (asserting that “it is not entirely clear that workers are wellserved by effectively limiting the pool of available bargaining agents to LMRDA-compliant non-profit
membership organizations,” and suggesting that the emergence of “workers’ centers” may suggest
the viability of alternative models); Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform:
Opening Up the Possibilities For Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 827, 839 (2006)
(proposing “relaxing, ex ante, prophylactic safeguards that inhibit the emergence of alternative
approaches to worker representation”); Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 2000
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 501 (suggesting that unions be deregulated to allow for profit unions and unions
in which participation rights and membership are separated).
55
Estreicher, Deregulating, supra note __ at 512-13. See also Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids,
Union Democracy, and the Market for Union Control, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 367, 395-404 (considering
for-profit bargaining services and mechanisms comparable to tender offers and proxy fights, but
suggesting that they could not work within dues-paying system with non-transferable membership
rights); Donald L. Martin, An Ownership Theory of the Trade Union (1980) (developing concept of a
proprietary union).
56
15 U.S.C. § 17.
57
Estreicher, Deregulating, supra note __ at 513.
58
Schwab, supra note __ at 397; see also Petruska, supra note __ at 40-41.
59
Schwab, supra note __ at 400-04.
54
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controlling interest; they must persuade existing members of the union of their
superior efficiency.60
C.

Empowering Workers

There have also been a number of proposals to empower workers more
directly, such as by setting minimum levels of wages and through government
programs and regulations or by giving workers the tools to manage their human
capital in a manner akin to financial assets. This approach has implications for our
proposal.
Policymakers should seek to limit the range of non-wage issues that are
subject to negotiation between workers and employers. 61 For example, if health
insurance was provided uniformly by the government instead of as an incident of
employment, workers would not have to bargain with employers to obtain access to
healthcare on favorable terms. Such interventions would change the dynamics of
negotiations even under the current labor law regime: there would be fewer issues
for workers and employers to bargain over, workers would be less desperate, and
employers would not be able to eke out a competitive advantage from developing a
special skill in squeezing workers.62 Such policies would also play a complementary
role to the proposal here, by making the tender offer system that we propose, which
focuses exclusively on wages (while the government handles other issues such as
worker safety and insurance) less problematic.63 But this approach does entail a
break with the basic structure of labor law, which seeks to preserve a space for
workers and employers to strike tailored bargains covering multiple, unrelated
issues.64

Id. at 404.
E.g. Brett McDonnell & Matthew T. Bodie, From Mandates to Governance: Restructuring the
Employment Relationship, 81 Md. L. Rev. --- (forthcoming).
62
E.g. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Aneil Kovvali & Oluwatomi O. Williams, Lifting Labor’s Voice: A
Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice And Power Within American Corporate Governance,
106 Minn. L. Rev. --- (forthcoming 2022). But see Estreicher, Freedom of Contract, supra note __ at
847-49 (proposing that unions should be able to trade away certain statutory entitlements in
exchange for other protections that workers would value more); Stewart Schwab, The Union as
Broker of Employment Rights, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Labor and Employment
Law 248-72 (2012) (suggesting that union waivers of otherwise mandatory employment law
protections are less problematic than individual waivers, and providing examples where this is
already permitted).
63
See infra Part II.B.2 (suggesting that the tender offer system should focus exclusively on
improving total pay to workers).
64
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (employer and union must “confer in good faith” on specified topics,
“but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession”). The concept that employment arrangements should reflect the preferences of the
parties, as expressed in freely-negotiated agreements, is called “voluntarism” and has come under
60
61
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Policymakers could also pursue a broader class of interventions designed to
allow workers to tap, trade, or diversify their interest in human capital. Payday
loans are a crude existing device that allows workers to tap into the value of their
next paycheck by borrowing against it. But the tool is severely limited — it cannot
be used to diversify risk or tap into more than a few weeks of future income — and
it is generally only available on terms that are deeply unfavorable to workers. 65
Workers use payday loans because they are poor and desperate for liquidity, not
because such loans permit workers to address risk or to better their positions in
some other way.66 As a result, payday loans provide a cautionary tale of the limited
potential for financial schemes to improve worker wellbeing. 67
A more promising approach might be to allow workers to sell equity-like
instruments to fund investments that improve their income. Such “human capital
contracts” were first proposed by Milton Friedman and Simon Kuznets in 1945, and
have since become a prominent part of policy conversations on funding higher
education.68 Extensions to other areas — such as an exchange that allowed athletes
to sell interests in their future income to fans — have also been attempted, with a
certain limited success.69 While the concept informs the proposal here, a market for
equity-like interests in worker income would not improve worker incomes on its
own.70

increasing pressure over time. Samuel Estreicher, Trade Unionism Under Globalization: The
Demise of Voluntarism?, 54 St. Louis U. L. J. 415, 417 (2010).
65
See, e.g., Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1093
(2019); Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Other Half Banks (2015).
66
See Jonathan Macey, Fair Credit Markets: Using Household Balance Sheets to Promote
Consumer Welfare, 100 Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3781164.
67
For another, more exotic, proposal, see Michael Abramowicz, Toward Livelihood Insurance,
2021 U. Chi. Legal F. 17 (proposing system of private insurance in which workers could protect
against risk of adverse changes in employment prospects).
68
See, e.g., Benjamin M. Leff & Heather Hughes, Student Loan Derivatives: Improving on
Income-Based Approaches to Financing Law School, 61 Vill. L. Rev. 99, 102-05 (2016).
69
Victoria L. Schwartz, The Celebrity Stock Market, 52 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2033 (2019)
(discussing Fantex exchange for athletes, and discussing possibility of broader celebrity equity
markets); Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Human Equity? Regulating the New Income Share Agreements,
68 Vand. L. Rev. 681 (2015) (discussing broad range of attempts to sell interests in human capital
and arguing against a uniform regulatory approach).
70
A market for equity-like interests in worker income might have useful second-order effects.
For example, it would allow workers to diversify away part of the risk that their income would
decrease. That in turn should enable workers to make risky investments that would increase their
value, such as developing firm or industry specific skills. An investor in the labor tender offer
market could offer similar incentives to workers in an effort to boost returns. See infra Part IV.C.
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The Proposal

This Part lays out a market-based solution to the problems of low union
uptake and low union credibility. The basic concept is simple. An investor would
offer an upfront cash payment to workers in exchange for their votes in a union
certification election. If the investor won the election, it would be certified as the
exclusive bargaining representative for the workers for a defined period, and would
recoup its upfront payments to workers over time by taking a certain percentage of
any gains that it secured for the workers by bargaining on their collective behalf.
This approach would produce a healthier environment for collective
bargaining and by channeling investors’ profit motive, expand the number of
potential union organizers. The upfront payments we propose would encourage
workers to agree to collective bargaining by allowing them immediately to tap some
of its future value, and would give the investor a way to demonstrate its sincere
belief in its ability to deliver that value in the form of higher wages. The structure
of the backend compensation, in which workers and investors would share in future
wage gains, would align the interests of the investor and the workers. The overall
system would work to expand, hopefully dramatically, the resources available to
identify groups of exploited workers and act to improve their wages, while
challenging established unions to do more to retain their market shares in the field
of union representation of workers.
This approach would do minimal violence to the basic scheme of labor law,
authorizing properly-regulated for-profit labor organizations and payments to
workers during certification campaigns, while leaving other features of labor law
intact. But each component of the system requires elaboration. As discussed below,
there is room for reasonable disagreement on many issues that would affect the
operation of the scheme that we propose. In this Article we identify the key issues
while surfacing relevant insights from corporate experience. Part II.A discusses the
mechanics of upfront offers, including the potential for competing bids and the
possibility of mandated disclosure. Part II.B discusses the mechanics of
representation by an investor, including the tools available to investors and the
need to control conflicts of interest. Part II.C considers how gains achieved for
workers during an initial period of representation can be maintained over the
longer term.
A.

Upfront Offer Process

Investors would be permitted to make upfront cash offers to workers in
exchange for the transfer of their votes in union certification elections and a share
of subsequent wage gains to be obtained by the workers’ representative in future
negotiations. Traditional unions, hedge funds, private equity firms, and new
specialist firms could participate in the space as investors. To be effective, the
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system would need to generate a robust flow of offers while maintaining an orderly
process that allowed workers to evaluate bids and maximize the value they receive
from the investors.
In the modern corporate context, analogous problems are addressed by the
board of directors. If an acquirer attempts to purchase a large number of shares
from stockholders with a coercive or lowball tender offer, the corporation’s board of
directors can use takeover defenses like the poison pill to block the effort and force
the acquirer into a negotiation.71 The board can also structure a rational process to
test market values, including by shopping the company to other potential bidders,
setting up an auction process designed to attract interested bidders, and providing a
measure of finality when the process concludes. 72
The current system is flawed because corporate managers and directors have
an incentive to protect their jobs by preventing would-be acquirers from succeeding
even if their offers would create superior value for the shareholders. But this
perverse incentive is mitigated by robust and interlocking mechanisms of judiciallyenforced fiduciary duties, shareholder voting, compensation schemes, and norms
among business elites that encourage leaders to do the best they can for
stockholders.73 The existence of a relatively trustworthy board of directors checks
the problems associated with a chaotic market-driven process without heavy
reliance on government regulation.74
The labor context lacks an analogue for the board of directors. Management
obviously faces an irreducible conflict, as it represents shareholders whose interests
often are directly opposed to workers’ interests, particularly when it comes to the
issue of workers’ wages. As a result, management would prefer no collective

E.g. Air Prods. & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 57 (Del. Ch. 2011) (noting that
corporate boards are empowered to resist “threat” of “substantive coercion” from an inadequate bid
by using poison pill, even in combination with other defenses like classified board structure).
72
E.g. Guhan Subramanian & Annie Zhao, Go-Shops Revisited, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1215, 122223 (2020) (discussing judicial acceptance of “go shop” term in which a board agrees to an acquisition
with the condition that it can seek out higher bids, but finding that go shop provisions have lost
effectiveness).
73
See Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance Machine, 121 Colum.
L. Rev. 2563 (2021) (describing system of institutional players that orient corporate governance
toward shareholder value maximization); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory
Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 Cornell L. Rev. 91, 139-55 (2020) (describing powerful
incentives that corporate directors and officers have to maximize shareholder value, even when they
have been granted express legal authority to pursue other goals).
74
The market for corporate control is shaped by some rules, several of which inform our
proposals here. See infra note __ (discussing requirement that tender offers remain open for 20
days); infra note __ (discussing requirement that shareholders make disclosures upon reaching
certain ownership thresholds); infra note __ (discussing requirement that terms of tender offers be
disclosed).
71
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bargaining, and absent that would prefer to face organizers who will not negotiate
too vigorously on the workers’ behalves. In unionized workplaces, incumbent
unions could conceivably play a constructive role. But unions are present in only a
small percentage of private workplaces. And where they are present, they have an
obvious incentive to preclude outside efforts to replace them in collective
bargaining, and no clear economic incentive to strike a good bargain on behalf of
their workers.75
As a result, there is a justification for a larger and more direct role for
government regulation in the market for labor union control that we propose here
than there is in the existing market for corporate control. This section addresses
three aspects of upfront bidding that indicate the need for a regulatory backstop for
the market. First, it may be appropriate to regulate the structure of bids to ensure
that they are straightforward, non-coercive and can be easily evaluated by workers.
Second, it may be appropriate to provide a uniform framework for union
representation contests in which there are multiple bidders to permit workers to
weigh the competing bids. Finally, it may be necessary to provide for disclosure of
worker contact information and of investor bids to facilitate the market for union
representation.
1.

Structure of Offers

At the heart of our proposal is the idea that unions and other firms should be
able to offer workers a cash payment in exchange for their votes in union
certification elections. Effectuating our proposal would require certain
modifications of existing law. Union elections are currently expected to be
conducted under “laboratory conditions,”76 and, under current law, a union cannot
offer financial incentives for workers to give their support. 77
Some issues with bids are best left to competition. Most obviously, different
investors should be allowed to offer different amounts of money in exchange for
See supra Part I.B.2 (describing legal and other barriers to competition).
In re Gen. Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) (“In election proceedings, it is the
Board's function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions
as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.”); see also Med.
Ancillary Servs., 212 N.L.R.B. 582, 584 (1974) (Penello, J. dissenting) (observing that “the Board, in
General Shoe Corporation, adopted its 'laboratory conditions' rationale”); Michael D. Moberly,
Corrections before Representation Elections: Restoring Laboratory Conditions by Repudiating Unfair
Labor Practices, 4 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 375, 377 (2002) (The NLRB requires that elections be
held under “laboratory conditions.”).
77
See NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 277 (1973) (finding violation where union offered
to waive initiation fees in exchange for worker’s public support, because practice would allow “the
union to buy endorsements”); Nestle Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 578, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1995)
(union thwarts “employees’ fair and free choice” in an election if it offers a benefit whose “influence
was to ‘purchase’ votes or [is] otherwise ‘undue’” because it “influence[s] the vote without relation to
75
76
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workers’ votes. Some investors may be particularly confident of their ability to
generate large wage gains, either because they have developed a high level of
competence in conducting negotiations or because they have obtained control over
many workplaces in the relevant labor market. Such investors should be able to
signal their value to workers by making higher offers than their rivals. 78
Other issues will have to be regulated. As a general principle, it would be
worthwhile to regulate issues that might interfere with workers’ ability to obtain
and rationally weigh competing offers. First, it may be worthwhile to require
investors to hold offers open for some minimum period. By rule, corporate tender
offers must be held open for at least 20 business days. 79 The rule was introduced to
eliminate “Saturday Night Special” tender offers in which the offer was held open
for only a brief period, and shareholders were pressured to make a hasty decision
before full information was available. The case for a similar deliberative period is
particularly strong in the labor context. Unlike the situation for shareholders who
sell their shares in a tender offer, workers who sell their votes will be in an ongoing
and important relationship with the investor who buys the workers’ votes for
several years. It is critical to ensure that workers have a meaningful time to
deliberate over any and all investor offers.
Second, it would be advisable to prohibit structurally coercive or
discriminatory offers. For example, an offer that paid workers more if they
tendered early would pressure workers to make an unduly hasty decision. Both
corporate law80 and labor law81 have analogous principles, and it would be sensible

the merits of the election”); Owens-Illinois, Inc., 271 NLRB No. 194 (Aug. 24, 1984) (providing
jackets with union insignia to employees who had voiced support for union was objectionable
conduct).
78
Investors might also be allowed to decide for themselves whether to make an offer
conditional on success. An investor that is very confident of victory and wanted to signal that
confidence might offer cash to every worker that signed up. An investor that is less certain might
offer to pay cash if and only if it prevailed in the election.
79
See SEC Rule 14e-1(a), 17 CFR 240.14e-1(a); see also Securities and Exchange Commission,
Tender Offer FAQs
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/802481/000119312506199094/dex996.htm#:~:text=A%20ten
der%20offer%20must%20remain,days%20after%20certain%20material%20changes. (“Every tender
offer must be open a minimum of 20 business days. Every offer has an initial expiration date (i.e.,
the end of the 20th business day), but this expiration date may be extended by the bidder.”).
80
E.g. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985) (noting that a twotier offers in which shareholders who tender early get one form of consideration while squeezed out
shareholders get a different form of consideration “are a classic coercive measure designed to
stampede shareholders into tendering at the first tier, even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of
what they will receive at the back end of the transaction,” and empowering boards to resist them).
81
NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973) (forbidding waiving initiation fees for workers
who sign union authorization cards because the practice “allows the union to buy endorsements and
paint a false portrait of employee support during its election campaign.”).
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to utilize them in the context of our proposal. Investors should, of course, also be
prohibited from offering different amounts to different workers in the same election
based on protected characteristics, such as race or sex. By contrast, varying offers
based on other characteristics like years of experience would not be objectionable, as
the value of union representation might vary from worker to worker depending on
their seniority.
As one element of the prohibition on structural coercion or discrimination, an
investor that prevailed in a certification election should be required to take further
steps. For example, the successful bidder should also have to treat all workers
equally in wage negotiations, regardless of whether some workers declined to sell
their votes.
Specific details of the regulatory infrastructure necessary to implement our
proposal are discussed below.82 But it is clear that workers who refuse to sell their
votes should be offered compensation when a majority of workers sell their voting
rights, and bargaining power shifts to the buyer. For example, a prevailing investor
should be required to offer dissenters the same amount that it had offered the
majority of workers.83 In other words, an investor that prevailed in an election by
buying 51% of votes for $1,000 each should have to offer $1,000 to each dissenting
worker. Other details of the scheme would affect the importance of this point. If
the investor wins the right to compel dissenters to join a strike, or is empowered to
collect a portion of the dissenters’ wage gains, it would be more appropriate to insist
on an upfront payment to the dissenters.

See infra Part II.B.1, 3.
For example, in France, individuals or legal entities that come to hold (alone or in concert,
directly or indirectly) more than 30% of a listed company's shares or voting rights must immediately
inform the company and the federal regulator of securities (the Autorité des Marché Financiers) and
must file a tender offer for all the outstanding equity securities. The mandatory tender offer price
must be at least the highest price paid by the bidder for securities of the target during the 12-month
period preceding the crossing of the 30% threshold. Armand W Grumberg, Arash Attar-Rezvani and
Julien Zika, Public Mergers and Acquisitions in France: Overview, Thomson Reuters, Practical Law
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/4-5021646?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_anchor_a323509
82
83
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2.

Competing Bids

Ideally, the system would support a robust flow of offers, and workers would
sometimes have the luxury of choosing between competing bids. While competition
would help to ensure that workers received full value for the benefits of collective
bargaining, it will be necessary to ensure that the competition proceeds in a fair and
orderly way.
The regulatory scheme might help by limiting the dimensions of the
competition. Substantively, the scheme should require a set of standardized terms,
so that bidders are only competing on a very limited number of variables like the
amount of the upfront offers. More procedurally, the scheme should require bidders
to deliver to workers a simple, standardized disclosure document that cleanly lays
out key points about each offer and each bidder’s historical performance. 84
The system should also make allowances for deals between competing
investors. If one investor attracts 25% support and another attracts 35% support,
the result should generally not be a failure to certify an exclusive bargaining
representative. Instead, there should be a deal between the investors and the
workers that results in certification. This may call for an additional set of rules to
prevent cartels or other forms of strategic behavior. At a minimum, investors
should be required to disclose if they are working as a group. 85
3.

Mechanics

The system would pose at least two potentially-related mechanical
challenges. First, an investor would need some way of identifying and contacting
employees. Second, it would be appropriate to require investors to disclose their
campaigns, either at the outset or after reaching some threshold level of support.

Simplicity is an important virtue in disclosures and contracting. See, e.g., Karen Eggleston,
Eric Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, Simplicity and Complexity in Contracts, University of Chicago,
John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 93, January 19, 2000,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=205391; Omri Ben‐Shahar and James J. White,
Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto‐Manufacturing Contracts, in Boilerplate: The Foundation of
Market Contracts 29–44 (Omri Ben‐Shahar ed., 2007), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Excessively detailed mandatory disclosures are unlikely to be helpful to workers who have finite
time and capacity. See, e.g. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, More Than You Wanted To
Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure (2014). But a clean and well-designed disclosure can call
attention to information that should be relevant to their decision. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler &
Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness 192-93 (2008)
(describing clean design of mandatory fuel economy stickers for cars, indicating miles per gallon and
estimated fuel costs along with benchmarks for comparison). Standardized disclosures would also be
helpful to investors, regulators, and researchers seeking to aggregate data for purposes of analysis.
85
Cf. Morales v. Quintel Entertainment, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing
Exchange Act section 13(d) disclosure requirement for investors acting as a “group”).
84
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Investors would need to be able to contact employees to share information
about their offers. At one extreme, the system might make no accommodations. An
investor that wanted to organize a workplace might be required to use normal
advertising channels, and take other steps such as setting up a physical presence
outside of the workplace to attract the necessary level of support. At another
extreme, employers might be required to deliver investors’ offers to their
employees,86 or to share employee contact information with a qualified investor that
had expressed an interest or achieved some threshold level of support, such as by
collecting signatures on a ballot.87
On balance, the best policy would be for regulation to actively facilitate
communication between investors and employees. For example, in the corporate
context, activists mounting a proxy fight are generally able to get access to the
information required to contact other stockholders. 88 That said, sharing employees’
personal contact information with investors would raise serious data privacy issues
that call for appropriate regulation. The system should address these issues by
incorporating appropriate data privacy and information security rules, and by
requiring investors to be appropriately registered with the National Labor Relations
Board.
Requiring investors to identify themselves when pursuing a tender offer has
distinct benefits. In the corporate context, shareholders are required to make
disclosures if they reach certain levels of ownership. For example, an investor or
group of investors generally is required to file a Schedule 13D or 13G form within

Bodie, Mandatory Disclosure, supra note __ at 638 (suggesting mandatory disclosure regime
with short forms provided directly to all employees and further disclosures on a website).
87
At present, if a union attracts enough support to trigger a certification election, the employer
must provide the NLRB’s regional director a list of eligible voters with their contact information.
The NLRB regional director then provides the list to the union. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S.
759, 767 (1969); Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239-40 (1966); 79 FR 74337-74340.
The NLRB proposed to change this requirement in July 2020, citing worker privacy concerns, but
ultimately failed to take action on the proposal. 85 F.R. 45553 (2020). An analogous requirement
here would force employers to share contact information with an investor that had achieved 30%
acceptance of its offer. It is unlikely that the system could compel employers to provide investors
with physical access to the workplace without just compensation. See Cedar Point Nursery v.
Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021) (finding that required access was a “taking” under the Fifth
Amendment).
88
See 8 Del. C. 220(b)(1); High River Ltd. P’ship v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 2019 WL
6040285, at *6 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 2019) (discussing with approval precedent establishing that a
stockholder could access “purely logistical information” about “how to reach stockholders” in
connection with a proxy contest, though distinguishing from other information that might be useful
in swaying stockholders’ votes). Various institutional investors must also regularly file a Schedule
13F which publicly discloses their ownership of public corporations. See Alexander I. Platt, Beyond
“Market Transparency”: Investor Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 74 Stan. L. Rev. --(forthcoming 2022) (discussing the implications of 13F disclosure for corporate governance).
86
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ten days of acquiring 5% or more of the stock of a public company. 89 Acquirers
making a tender offer must immediately disclose information about their offers. 90
In the corporate space, this type of disclosure can facilitate a more vigorous
and orderly competition. If everyone knows that a company is “in play,” anyone
with an interest can make an appropriate bid, and shareholders are more likely to
receive significant value or their shares. Disclosures also allow for a rational
weighing of offers, instead of a frantic rush to tender. But there are significant
potential costs to this type of disclosure. By reducing the profitability of
acquisitions, due to others’ ability to see the opportunity and free ride on the initial
acquirer’s efforts, disclosure will reduce the amount of activity in the space by
reducing bidders’ incentives to bid in the first place. 91 Disclosure also allows
management to take defensive steps to frustrate acquirers, which many
commentators believe disserves the shareholders’ interests. 92
These benefits and costs would have analogues in the labor tender offer
space. Secret campaigns by competing investors would likely confuse employees,
particularly if the competing bids are not presented to workers in an organized or
centralized way. A secret process might also mean that an investor could purchase
representation rights to a workplace even if some other investor would have been
prepared to make a higher offer. Certain limited disclosures would help address the
need for investors to get access to employee information. But disclosure could make
the process less profitable and thus reduce the incentives of potential investors to
make an offer to workers of pay for their votes in union elections. It could also
facilitate interference by employers eager to frustrate collective bargaining. Given

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13-d(a) (“Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the
beneficial ownership of any equity security . . . is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than five percent of the class shall, within 10 days after the acquisition, file with the Commission, a
statement containing the information required by Schedule 13D.”).
90
Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffry M. Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 65
Wash. U. L. Q. 131 (1987) (describing the regulation of tender offers and non-tender offer purchases
of significant stock in a target company).
91
Frank Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harvard L. Rev.1161 (1981) (arguing that resistance by a
corporation's managers to premium tender offers, should be proscribed because they decrease
shareholder welfare); cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of
Blockholder Disclosure, 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 39, 41 (2012) (“tightening disclosure requirements can
be expected to reduce the returns to blockholders and thereby reduce the incidence and size of
outside blocks as well as blockholders’ investments in monitoring and engagement—which, in turn,
could well result in increased agency costs and managerial slack”).
92
See Macey & Netter, supra note __ at 133 (criticizing the mandatory disclosure requirements
of takeover regulations).
89
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the strenuous efforts of many employers to avoid unionization today, 93 there is good
reason for concern about employer interference with investor efforts.
B.

Representation During the Initial Term

If the investor won a certification election, the investor would be recognized
as the exclusive bargaining representative for the workers in the bargaining unit for
a stated period of time. In order for the system to succeed, investors would need to
have clear incentives to advance worker interests, and meaningful tools to facilitate
collective bargaining. This section considers rules that would align investor and
worker interests, including (1) accountability through voting, (2) compensation for
investors aligned to a metric that reflects worker interests, (3) limits on total
compensation to investors, and (4) rules addressing potential conflicts of interest
between investors and workers. The section concludes by discussing (5) the powers
available to an investor that is certified as the exclusive bargaining representative
for a group of workers.
1.

Term of Representation

After the investor wins an election, that investor would be recognized as the
exclusive bargaining representative for the workers for a finite term. A set term is
not strictly necessary to the operation of the scheme. Unions today are largely
shielded from efforts to call elections that might dislodge them. 94 This sclerotic,
anti-democratic arrangement is justified on the grounds that it promotes stability in
labor relations, and is consistent with the broader approach of relying on solidarity
instead of competition to motivate appropriate union behavior.
Whatever the benefits of this approach in the context of traditional non-profit
unions, it seems intolerable in the context of a market-based system intended to
promote healthy competition. Corporate analogies again are instructive. Corporate
E.g. Gordon Lafer & Lola Loustaunau, Fear at work, Economic Policy Institute (July 23,
2020), https://files.epi.org/pdf/202305.pdf (“Employers . . . collectively spend $340 million per year on
‘union avoidance’ consultants who teach them how to exploit [the] weakness of federal labor law to
effectively scare workers out of exercising their legal right to collective bargaining.”); Weiler,
Governing the Workplace, supra note __ at 111 (an employer eager to avoid unionization can mount
“a vigorous campaign against the union in which management regularly raises the spectre of strikes
and job losses, and adds credibility to the threats through selective discriminatory action against key
union supporters”).
94
See, e.g., Kye D. Pawlenko, Reevaluating Inter-Union Competition: A Proposal to Resurrect
Rival Unionism, 8 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 651, 652-53 (2006) (describing “certification bar”
preventing successful election petitions for one year after a union is certified, “recognition bar”
preventing petitions for a “reasonable” period after a union is voluntarily recognized by the employer
on a showing of majority support, and a “contract bar” preventing petitions for up to three years
during the term of a valid collective bargaining agreement); Samuel Estreicher, “Easy In, Easy Out”:
A Future for U.S. Workplace Representation, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 1615, 1628-29 (2014) (describing
obstacles to elections to removing an ineffective union).
93
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law relies on a triad of mechanisms for disciplining officers and directors: the
market for corporate control, fiduciary duties, and regular accountability in
shareholder elections. In some ways, the mechanism of shareholder voting is the
most fundamental, and it has proven to be the most durable and vigorously
protected by law.95 Using the mechanism of voting, shareholders recently have had
remarkable success in registering their disappointment with the management and
boards of directors of major companies.96 Like the shareholders of major
corporations, workers should have regular opportunities to register disappointment
with their union representatives and unseat them, while the union representatives
should have sufficient time to produce results for the workers whose interests they
are supposed to serve.
Thus the term of the representation should balance these competing
concerns. The term should be short enough to ensure regular accountability to
workers. But it must also be long enough to promote stability and give the investor
a real opportunity to advocate for workers successfully. If an employer believes that
it can simply wait out a demanding investor, the investor will not have an
opportunity to prove the value of collective bargaining, and neither the investor nor
workers will be able to realize the benefits of such bargaining.. 97
We believe that a five-year renewable term would balance the need for
stability with democratic values. It can take over a year for unions to reach an
initial collective bargaining agreement with management, implying that terms
must be meaningfully longer for the system to work. 98 A five-year term also should
not seem too short to potential investors — private equity firms typically seek exits

See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Story of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp.: Keeping the Electoral
Path to Takeovers Clear, in Corporate Law Stories 243 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009) (describing how
Delaware courts removed legal checks to corporate boards’ ability to stymie takeover bids, while
retaining legal checks on boards’ ability to interfere with shareholder voting).
96
In a recent high profile example, a small hedge fund called Engine No. 1 won three seats on
the board of oil giant ExxonMobil by persuading shareholders to back their candidates over
management’s. Impact investors like Engine No. 1 launch their campaigns with the goal of changing
a company’s strategy or values. ExxonMobil was vulnerable to a campaign because of its weak
response to climate issues and its flagging stock price performance. See, e.g. Madeline Ray, Impact
Investment in Action: Climate Activists Shake up Exxon’s Board, Sage Business Cases (July 6,
2021),
https://sk.sagepub.com/cases/impact-investment-in-action-climate-activists-shake-up-exxon-board.
95

Cf. Estreicher, Deregulating, supra note __ at 526; Weiler, Striking New Balance, supra note
__ at 352 (an employer can prevent a new union from fully establishing itself by preventing the
union from successfully negotiating a first contract).
98
Robert Combs, How Long Does It Take Unions to Reach First Contracts?, Bloomberg Law
(June 1, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-how-long-does-ittake-unions-to-reach-first-contracts (finding that new unions take an average of 409 days to
negotiate a first contract, with the time period varying by industry).
97

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4038439

Boston College Law Review (Forthcoming)

27

after 5.4 years on average,99 and investors in the market for union control should be
comfortable with the need to generate returns within that timeframe. Policymakers
might also consider a shorter timeframe, perhaps drawing on the current structure
of labor law, which effectively grants a one-year grace period to unions to strike a
deal, and a three-year grace period if they do. 100 In setting the timeframe,
policymakers might also consider the typical length of a collective bargaining
agreement, the typical tenure for a worker, and the possibility of varying terms by
industry or by labor market conditions.
2.

Choice of Objectives

During its period of representation, the investor should have a clear financial
incentive to advance worker interests. But the concept of worker interests is broad
and far from self-defining. Workers may have a broad range of concerns — starting
with wages, but including working conditions, benefits, scheduling, and dignitary
interests — some of which would be difficult to monetize in a transparent way. 101
In designing incentives, policymakers would have to balance the goal of responding
to the full range of workers’ needs against the goal of keeping the bid sheets for
workers’ votes simple enough that workers can follow them. Even apart from
helping workers to police misconduct, a simple metric would help workers evaluate
the usefulness of collective bargaining and to better use investor performance as a
benchmark for union performance.
Perhaps the simplest approach would be for the investor to take a percentage
of the gain in cash wages that the bargaining unit actually achieved within the
term.102 This structure would ensure that the investor would only profit if the
Greg Winterton, Private Equity Holding Periods Reach All-time High in 2020, Alpha Week
(Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.alpha-week.com/private-equity-holding-periods-reach-all-time-high2020
100
See supra notes __ & __ (describing the one-year certification bar and the three-year contract
bar).
101
See, e.g., Schwab, supra note __ at 381-82 (describing array of monetary and non-monetary
benefits valued by workers). Labor law acknowledges the range of permissible objectives that
workers might have in collective bargaining by requiring employers to engage in good faith with a
union on several topics. These mandatory subjects for collective bargaining include rate of pay, but
also extend to method of pay, work rules, safety, promotions, order of layoffs, discipline, drug testing,
and arbitration and grievance procedures. See Allied Chems. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union
No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971) (employer must bargain over any
“mandatory subject of bargaining,” i.e. the “issues that settle an aspect of the relationship between
the employer and employees”); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349-50
(1958) (it is lawful to insist upon negotiation of matters subject to mandatory bargaining, i.e.,
matters that settle a term or condition of employment); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (employer and
representative of employees must bargain “with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment”); Michael Evan Gold, An Introduction to Labor Law 74-75 (3d ed. 2014).
102
There are some antecedents in labor union practices. See Schwab, supra note __ at 382
(describing schemes granting higher pay to union officials when members enjoyed higher pay). This
99

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4038439

28

Labor Tender Offer

workers realized a tangible economic benefit that is easy for the workers to
understand and value.
Admittedly, the approach would collapse performance down to one number
that may not capture all of the relevant goals in current collective bargaining
arrangements.103 It is difficult to place a monetary value on job security, working
conditions, or training, especially given different tastes of workers and changing
labor market conditions.104 But this problem exists not only under our proposed
system, but under any system. Wages are highly salient and easy to evaluate. They
are bound to become the lodestar measure for evaluating competing bids by
prospective collective bargainers. Ultimately, the benefits of our proposal outweigh
the costs, particularly in light of the defects with current collective bargaining
schemes and the ability of workers to reject any proposal from an investor that they
deem insufficient. It is not clear what objectives unions pursue in collective
bargaining,105 and limited accountability mechanisms — the absence of meaningful
competition or voting requirements — allow union leaders to pursue objectives that
are not tethered to the preferences of real workers. 106
Existing labor law does help limit the potential for intra-union disputes about
goals by focusing attention on appropriate bargaining units: workers with similar
jobs are likely to have similar needs and prospects, so they are unlikely to have
radically different preferences. But this control comes at a significant cost, as it
limits the potential power of collective bargaining and undermines its capacity to
benefit workers.107
Ultimately, our proposal reduces agency costs and reduces complexity by
simply paying workers cash up front in exchange for representation by an investor

would require a change to antitrust laws, to permit a for-profit organization to organize workers
without fear of liability. Estreicher, Deregulating, supra note __ at 515.
103
Cf. Martin, supra at 2 (listing range of maximands for unions that appear in the literature);
Estreicher, supra at 519 (suggesting that representative might seek authority only on limited issues
like wages or pensions, reducing concern about tradeoffs).
104
Of course, if the system deliberately excludes a matter from the investor’s incentives, that
matter should not be a subject of mandatory bargaining through the investor – workers and the
employer should be free to strike separate deals, whether on an individual or collective basis.
105
Martin, supra note __ at 1-2 (noting “embarrassing number” of proposed answers to the
“deceptively simple question . . . ‘What do unions maximize?’”).
106
See Macey, supra note __ at 336-44 (noting hurdles to controlling agency costs in the union
context).
107
For some of the potential benefits of a broader approach, see infra Part III.B (describing
potential benefits from sectoral bargaining). The narrow approach may also make it difficult for
unions to pursue certain value-creating strategies. See Estreicher, Freedom of Contract, supra note
__ at 839 (because “unions represent only a fraction of an employer’s nonsupervisory personnel . . .
the union is encouraged to pursue an agenda that, while it may benefit the represented group, may
also detract from the overall economic position of the firm”).
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with a narrow mandate. To the extent that workers care deeply about issues other
than wages, they can express that preference by refusing to tender unless they are
offered a sufficient amount of cash to compensate for these other issues. This does
not eliminate the potential for serious conflicts. Even within a small workplace,
workers can have widely divergent interests: a long-serving older employee nearing
retirement may care deeply about pension and health benefits, while a new younger
employee may be more interested in higher wages and family paid leave. Actually
reconciling such conflicts is necessarily costly,108 and it is not clear that existing
systems of union democracy are actually effective in finding reasonable or efficient
answers. Flattening preferences into a narrow mandate to maximize wages is an
efficient approach to improving outcomes for workers, much as corporate managers’
narrow mandate to maximize stock returns has driven major gains for shareholders.
That said, some adjustments to a pure wage metric may be appropriate. For
example, investors might be given specific financial incentives to press grievances
or force employers to eliminate illegal behavior. Investors would already have an
incentive to litigate wage and hour violations and labor law violations. If an
employer underpays workers or undercounts hours, it would also cut into the
investor’s returns, and if an employer sabotages labor organizing, it would also
damage the investor’s business model. This in itself would be meaningful, as
employers currently face limited consequences for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act or the National Labor Relations Act. 109 But investors might also be
given financial incentives to press other issues, such as violations of workplace
safety regulations or unlawful discrimination. Unions today have a duty of fair
representation that encourages them to press grievances identified by workers. 110
The regulatory scheme might adjust investor compensation to provide similar
encouragement.111
Other adjustments would help to curb destructive gamesmanship. Investors
must not be incentivized to bargain away $2 of health insurance benefits for $1 of
Cf. Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (2000) (suggesting that employee-owned
firms are essentially absent from some industries due to the difficulty of managing competing
interests).
109
See Anna Stansbury, Do US Firms Have An Incentive to Comply with the FLSA and the
NLRA?, Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper 21-9 (Aug. 2021),
https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/wp21-9.pdf.
110
John H. Fanning, The Duty of Fair Representation, 19 B.C. L. Rev. 813, 813, 814 (1978)
(“The doctrine of fair representation imposes upon labor organizations a duty to represent fairly all
members of a bargaining unit,” workers “are entitled to expect that the union will bargain effectively
on their behalf.”).
111
The adjustments could be framed as a bounty for successfully litigated issues, a penalty for
failing to press an issue that the worker or government later litigated successfully, or a mandate to
insure workers against injuries. Apart from incentivizing robust action, the system should also
avoid creating a disincentive for investors to organize workplaces where lawbreaking is suspected.
108
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wages. Adjustments to address these problems can be made easily. For example,
the system might look to established markets or actuarial principles to capture the
economic value of a Cadillac health insurance plan or retirement benefits, and
incorporate that into the calculation. The economic value of any improvements
would then be factored into the investor’s compensation, in much the same way as
an increase in wages.
Another set of adjustments would discourage investors from playing workers
against each other. Such adjustments may not be necessary. With a pure wage
metric, an investor would not benefit from a zero-sum transfer from one group of
workers to another. Reducing one worker’s wages by $100 to increase two other
workers’ wages by $50 each might be a winning tactic for a traditional union
seeking to remain in place, as it would purchase two votes at the cost of one vote. 112
But it would not be a profitable strategy for an investor taking a cut of total wage
increases, as there would be no improvement in the total. Still, adjustments would
affirmatively discourage this type of maneuver. At an extreme, an investor might
be deemed ineligible for compensation if any worker’s wages decline. Under this
approach, investors would not be permitted to bargain for reductions in wages or
working conditions, ever. This would insure that no worker is made worse off as the
result of a decision to allow workers to sell their votes. A less extreme approach
might weight wage reductions more heavily than wage increases. 113
Depending on the actual operation of the system, policymakers should
consider additional adjustments. For example, policymakers might encourage
investors to prioritize wage increases for the lowest-paid employees. This would be
justified by Rawls’s difference principle, which suggests that inequality is only
tolerable if it improves outcomes for the worst-off members of society. 114 But the
change may have limited benefits.115 The change may have serious costs.116 And

This is not a given. Workers are conscious of tactics designed to divide them, and have cited
such concerns in rejecting contracts negotiated by unions. See supra notes __ to __ and
accompanying text. Still, this type of politicking can occur in less overt forms. For example, a union
might prioritize the pensions or job security prized by a contingent of older employees over the wage
increases that would be preferred by younger employees.
113
In the example above, a collective bargaining agreement that caused one worker’s wages to
decrease by $100 while two workers’ wages increase by $50 each would have a total wage increase of
$0. With an adjustment, the system might give double weight to declines. Under that approach, the
investor would be seen as causing a $100 decline across the three workers ($50+$50-2x$100).
114
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
115
Inequality across represented workers at a firm may not be significant in comparison to
inequality between managers and workers at the firm, or inequality between workers at different
firms. Such issues would suggest that inequality is better addressed through external regulation.
116
It could cost investors credibility among relatively well-paid employees, making it more
difficult for them to prevail in certification campaigns. It could also create costs by distorting
outcomes away from what would prevail in an ideal labor market.
112
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the change may be difficult or impossible to implement. 117 Policymakers should
consider gaining experience with the system in actual operation before making this
type of adjustment to the total wage metric.
Regardless of the metric, it would be necessary to determine a baseline.
Should wage gains be measured from the date that the investor won the
certification election, or some other time? Measuring from the date of the election
would be relatively simple. But it could give employers opportunities for mischief if
they respond to a newly launched tender offer by preemptively raising wages. 118 It
might be advisable to give the investor credit for gains that occur after a campaign
is announced but in advance of the vote.119 Measuring the baseline as of the date
the offer was disclosed120 would create a clear, bright line rule.
It would also be necessary to decide how to handle changes in the composition
of the workforce at a company. If the employer fires a worker making $400 a week
and hires a new worker making $500 a week, should the investor be credited with a
$100 wage increase? If the employer fires two workers making $400 a week and
hires one new worker making $800 a week, should the investor face a penalty, or
should the system be indifferent?
These questions go to the basic goals of the system we propose. Is the
purpose of a representation to benefit the workers who voted for it, or to effect
change in the economy as a whole? Is the goal of the overall system to shift
decisions about the manner of production — how many people get hired, what
capital investments get made — or simply to ensure that labor gets its fair share of
profits? Policymakers might reasonably reach different answers on these questions,

Among other things, the concept of inequality is not self-defining, and policymakers may
struggle to explain which wage differences are objectionable. A new employee may be paid less than
a longstanding employee nearing retirement, and an employee with flexible work arrangements may
be paid less than an employee with a strict schedule.
118
Labor law currently prevents employers from conferring a benefit on employees shortly
before an election if it would be perceived as an implied promise or threat. E.g. NLRB v. Exchange
Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act “prohibits not
only intrusive threats and promises but also conduct immediately favorable to employees which is
undertaken with the express purpose of impinging upon their freedom of choice for or against
unionization and is reasonably calculated to have that effect.”).
119
In the corporate takeover and activism space, an acquirer would benefit if the target took an
action that raised the stock price because the acquirer would be able to sell its shares for a profit. It
would be problematic if the investor accepted a greenmail-like side payment to go away, but if the
investor frightens the employer into making changes that benefit the workers, it has done real work
even if it does not win an election or achieve post-election gains.
120
See supra Part II.A.3.
117
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and indeed might vary their answers over time depending on changing
macroeconomic conditions.121
One view is that the system should preserve labor market flexibility. Under
this conception, investors should not prevent employers from changing the
composition of the workforce if doing so creates economic value. Investors should
instead seek to ensure that the workforce receives the largest possible share of that
value. A natural implementation of this approach would be to base investor
compensation on total payroll. Replacing a worker making $400 a week with a new
worker making $500 a week would raise total payroll, and the investor could claim
a percentage. Replacing two workers making $400 a week each with one new
worker making $800 a week would have no impact on payroll, and the investor’s
compensation would not be directly affected.122
Although the investor’s compensation would not be directly impacted by
changes in the workforce that do not result in wage increases for the workforce as a
whole, the investor may still have strategic reasons to try to obtain protection
against termination in any collective bargaining agreement with the employer.
Investors would have good reason to try to increase the value of a worker to the
employer, as it would support further wage increases. 123 Workers with some degree
of job security would be more likely to make firm-specific investments in human
capital.124 If the investor hopes to remain in place for a second term, 125 or if it needs

Cf. Martin L. Weitzman, The Share Economy (1984) (suggesting stagflation could be
addressed through labor agreements granting workers a share of revenues, so that compensation per
worker would go down as employers increased the size of the workforce). Among other things,
policymakers might seek to preserve total employment during recessions, even at the cost of some
reduction in real wages.
If inflation is a meaningful concern, it may also be appropriate to adopt a cost of living
adjustment, so that investors are only rewarded for increases in real wages. But this may not be
appropriate. Wages do not automatically rise to keep pace with inflation, so it may be appropriate to
reward investors for maintaining real wages in the face of inflation.
122
This indifference does create a misalignment between the incentives of the investor and
workers’ likely preference for secure employment. But under certain conditions, the misalignment
could help the investor demand higher wages than a union by increasing the credibility of its threats
and bargaining positions. Faced with a choice between a high employment – low wage scenario or a
low employment – high wage scenario, a traditional union may prefer high employment and low
wages while an investor would be indifferent. An employer that states that higher wages will lead to
a reduction in employment levels thus has more leverage against a traditional union than an
investor.
123
Cf. Estreicher, Freedom of Contract, supra note __ at 830-31 (describing “voice face” or
“value-added” function of unions in bargaining for provisions that have economic value but that
would be underproduced in an environment in which workers must bargain individually).
124
Cf. Blair & Stout, supra note __ at 250 (suggesting that corporate law empowers boards to
protect employee interests as part of a strategy to encourage employees to make firm-specific
investments).
125
See supra Part II.B.1.
121
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worker support for industrial actions like strikes,126 or if it needs to preserve its
reputation in the market to maintain its business model, it will also need to
maintain the trust and confidence of workers.
A straightforward total payroll approach would mean that the investor could
benefit from wage increases enjoyed by workers who did not vote to be represented
by the investor. Within labor law, this might be controversial: 27 states have “right
to work” laws that ensure that workers who refuse to join a union do not have to
pay union dues.127 In the public sector, the concept has been elevated to the stature
of a constitutional principle.128 But within corporate law, the need to control freerider problems is well understood: acquirers can generally “squeeze-out”
recalcitrant minority shareholders in exchange for fair compensation, and thus
capture the full benefit of their efforts to improve the company. 129 Drawing from
the corporate tradition would help ensure the vitality of the labor tender offer
market, though it would also call for appropriate measures to prevent abuses. 130
3.

Limits on Compensation

It may be appropriate to set limits on the amount that an investor could
collect if it wins an election and undertakes a representation. First, the system
might do nothing, and allow competition to drive compensation down to appropriate
levels. An investor who offers $1,000 for a worker’s vote and proposes to take 50%
of wage gains over the following three years would be undercut by an investor who
offers $1,000 for the vote and proposes to take only 20% of wage gains. Leaving the
issue to competition has distinct benefits. Limits on the percentage an investor
could claim would diminish the incentive to look for workplaces that could be
improved through collective bargaining, and the incentive to bargain hard to
increase wages after an election had been won.131

See infra Part II.B.4.
See Scott Neuman, Missouri Blocks Right-To-Work Law, NPR (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/08/636568530/missouri-blocks-right-to-work-law (“Currently, 27 states
and Guam have laws allowing employees in private-sector unionized workplaces to opt out of union
membership and union fees”). Federal law currently permits states to adopt right-to-work policies.
29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or
application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or
Territorial law.”). The proposed PRO Act would bar them.
128
Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018).
129
E.g. 8 Del. C. 253 (permitting a holder of 90% of a company’s stock to squeeze out the
remaining 10%).
130
For example, squeezed-out shareholders may be able to obtain a judicial valuation of their
shares through an appraisal. See 8 Del. C. § 262.
131
See supra note __ and accompanying text.
126
127
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In addition, a laissez faire approach may not lead to investors trying to claim
100% of the wage gains they achieve. It is not obvious that investors would want to
claim a maximum share of gains, because there are significant benefits to all parties
to keeping workers interested in growing their wages. Just like a private equity
firm that acquires a company and compensates managers with equity, the investor
might want to ensure that workers have a stake in improving performance. Having
skin in the game would make workers allies in the effort to drive up wages,
encouraging them to invest in skills that increase their productivity and value to
their employers, and to cooperate fully in labor actions.
But there are good reasons to think that limits on the percentage of wage
gains that investors could take would be beneficial. There are externalities to
workers retaining a meaningful stake in wage gains. One goal of the overall regime
is to give workers as a group a better sense of what can be achieved through
collective bargaining, so that the knowledge can be put to use in other workplaces.
That goal would be better served if workers can see a meaningful portion of the
impact of collective bargaining in their actual paychecks.
Relying on private ordering to protect worker interests might also be
unrealistic in light of the real financial desperation of many American workers.
Workers today are often willing to accept extraordinarily high interest rates on
payday loans to get access to their earnings a few weeks early. 132 If an investor
offers real money today in exchange for a cut of workers’ future earnings, workers
may not consider or bargain over the fine print.
Second, the system might place a ceiling on profitability. Under this
approach, investors would be limited to a certain return on their upfront payments
to workers. For example, suppose that an investor made $1,000 upfront payments
to workers in exchange for 50% of wage gains. In its representation, the investor
achieves a $5,000 wage increase, so that workers would ordinarily get $2,500 of the
gains and the investor would ordinarily get $2,500 of the gains. The system might
limit the investor’s returns, perhaps preventing the investor from doing more than
doubling its money. Under that restriction, the workers would get $3,000 of the
gains and the investor would get $2,000.
Like any restriction, this approach would diminish the potential profitability
of a representation, reducing investors’ willingness to bid. The approach would also
diminish an investor’s incentive to seek wage gains past a certain point. In the
Such loans are often highly detrimental to workers because of their high interest rates.
Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? 62 J. L. & Econ. 485
(2019) (“payday loan applicants barely approved for their first loans file for bankruptcy protection
significantly more often than barely rejected first-time applicants”).
132
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example above, the investor would have no direct financial reason to pursue a wage
gain of more than $4,000, because any further wage gain would go to the workers.
For this reason we would not advocate a cap on investors’ returns.
Finally, the system might place a ceiling on the percentage of wage gains an
investor could claim. For example, the system might specify that investors could
claim no more than 20% of wage gains achieved during their period of
representation.
This approach would again lower profitability and could reduce potential
bids. But it would help simplify and standardize the labor tender offer market,
making it easier for workers to weigh competing offers. Instead of comparing a bid
of $1,000 for 20% of gains against a bid of $1,000 for 40% of gains, a worker might
have to compare a bid of $1,000 for 20% of gains against a bid of $500 for 20% of
gains. By flattening the competition into a single monetary value, payable
immediately, this approach would improve workers’ capacity to weigh competing
offers. The approach would also mean that investors had an incentive to seek the
best possible deal, though at the cost of allowing a theoretically unlimited transfer
of value to investors.133
4.

Conflicts of Interest

The structure of backend compensation would help align the investor’s
interests with workers’ interests. But the capital markets overlay of the scheme
indicates that it will be advisable to adopt additional rules to deal with outside
financial interests of investors that could be adverse to the workers.
Some basic hypotheticals can illustrate the concern:
a. An investor that represents important workers at ABC Corp. might try to
hedge its interest in the workers’ wellbeing by taking a long position in ABC
stock. If workers are unable to extract major concessions, the investor might
lose on its initial investment in workers, but recoup the loss with gains on its
ABC stock. The investor’s investment in ABC Corp’s shares would
substantially diminish its incentive to drive a hard bargain with ABC
management.
b. A shareholder activist or other institutional investor with an outside
agenda with ABC might launch a labor tender offer for the sole purpose of

A slight variation would lower the ceiling as wage gains increased, thus forcing the investor
to share an escalating portion of wage gains with the workers. For example, an investor might be
permitted to claim 30% of the first $2,000 of wage gains, 20% of the next $2,000 of wage gains, and
10% of any additional wage gains.
133
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pressuring ABC to enact that agenda, as opposed to profiting from its interest
in improving worker outcomes.134
c. An investor that represents important workers at ABC might take a short
position in ABC or a long position in its competitor, DEF Corp. before
pursuing an industrial action that has the potential to damage ABC’s value.
While these positions would at least keep the investor adverse to ABC, they
could encourage the investor to pursue or persist in pursuing damaging
measures such as strikes even when a more conciliatory approach would be
more likely to advance the workers’ interests.

Each of these possibilities would alter the intended incentives for investors in
perverse ways. Instead of receiving compensation in a form that aligned its
interests with workers’ interests, the investor would be in a position to profit from
actions that did not support workers. At a minimum, investors should be required
to disclose any conflicts of interest to workers,135 and to explain the steps they will
take to manage those conflicts. A more fundamental remedy might prohibit
investors from taking outside conflicting interests related to a company during the
period of its representation of the company’s workers.
Other potential conflicts could arise within the labor representation business,
and present more ambiguous problems:
d. If an investor represents workers at ABC, it may obtain important inside
information on matters like profitability or worker productivity that the
investor could put to outside uses. Some outside uses, like trading in ABC’s

Existing corporate and labor law principles could limit the scope of this approach. Under
corporate law, shareholders are not permitted to make certain business decisions. The law vests
authority in the board of directors, and prevents shareholders from dictating what should be done on
various business issues. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (shareholder proposal can be excluded from
proxy if it “is not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the
company’s organization”); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1985) (“A cardinal precept of the
General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders,
manage the business and affairs of the corporation.”). Similarly, under labor law, management does
not need to bargain with labor representatives on “managerial decisions, which lie at the core of
entrepreneurial control.” Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 498 (1979) (quoting Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). As a result, an
investor that is eager to shape a business decision but unable to do so in its capacity as a shareholder
may also be unable to shape the decision as a representative of the workers.
135
See Estreicher, Freedom of Contract, supra note __ at 840-41 (proposing that policymakers
should relax labor law rules that attack conflicts of interest and instead “facilitate opportunities to
poll worker satisfaction after actual experience with the agency”). Cf. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard S.
Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev.
811 (2006) (proposing disclosure regime to address analogous problem of institutional shareholders
casting votes even after taking outside steps to hedge away an economic interest in the outcome).
134
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stock, may be objectionable. Other outside uses, like improving the investor’s
representation of DEF’s workers, are appropriate.
e. If an investor represents workers at multiple employers, it may face
complex tradeoffs. A strike at one employer may have implications for
workers at other employers. At present, unions are barred from conducting
secondary strikes, meaning that they could not call a strike at one of ABC’s
customers in an effort to further pressure ABC to make concessions. 136 Even
if this ban remained in place and was extended to investors, there may be a
range of available strategic behaviors. For example, witnessing a strike at
DEF might frighten ABC’s managers into making concessions. If the investor
has less to gain from its representation at DEF — perhaps fewer workers are
involved, or perhaps DEF’s workers are already better paid — it might take
an overly aggressive approach at DEF that puts DEF’s workers in a difficult
position in order to secure gains in its representation at ABC.
It is difficult to guess at the scope and implications of this type of problem
without seeing the system in operation. As a result, it may be appropriate to
articulate a broad standard and give content to that standard through applications
as the system evolved. One potential guiding principle could be that an investor
owes fiduciary duties to the workers it represents, much as union officers owe
fiduciary duties to workers.137 This concept may provide some intuitions on the
problems above. If the investor uses information it obtained from a representation
to further its private interests through securities trading, it would arguably be
abusing its position of trust.138 On the other hand, investors should have broad
discretion to pursue actions that are reasonably calculated to improve conditions for
workers, including by driving up wages at other employers. 139
A final set of issues relates to the potential use of capital markets strategies
to advance worker interests. Through the use of equity stakes held by pension
funds, advocates for labor are increasingly interested in using shareholder voting to
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). The PRO Act would permit secondary strikes.
See 29 U.S.C. § 501 (“The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor
organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members as a group.”)..
138
Cf. Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949) (conceptualizing insider trading as
a breach of corporate fiduciary duty).
139
Corporate law recognizes the need for shareholders’ representatives to have discretion by
insulating a broad range of good faith decisions from judicial review under the business judgment
rule. Labor law similarly recognizes the need for unions to have discretion as they bargain with
employers. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Intern. v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991) (“Congress did not
intend judicial review of a union’s performance to permit the court to substitute its own view of the
proper bargain for that reached by the union. . . . Any substantive examination of a union’s
performance, therefore, must be highly deferential, recognizing the wide latitude that negotiators
need for the effective performance of their bargaining responsibilities.”).
136
137
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force corporate boards of directors to adopt worker-friendly positions for their
companies.140 The strategy could map over easily to players in the labor tender
offer market. Investors could attempt even bolder strategies, such as buying up
debt of a bankrupt company to protect worker interests. 141 A full evaluation of such
strategies seems premature. Given the likely relative sizes of the markets,
investors are more likely to be tempted to use labor market strategies to advance
capital market goals than vice-versa. Companies also have powerful tools for
resisting capital market strategies, and may not need any regulatory assistance to
maintain an appropriate balance. But policymakers may want to remain alert to
new developments.
5.

Available Tools for Bargaining

An investor’s ability to drive gains would depend in part on the economic
weapons available to them. For example, an investor able to call a strike to
pressure management would be more effective in bargaining than one that lacked
such power.142 Of course, having an investor call a strike is extremely problematic
because they get a portion of the benefits from the strike, but the workers
experience all of the costs of the strike.
There are many potential approaches to the issue. First, an investor that
prevailed in a certification election might be deemed to have the power to require
workers to participate in a strike. Courts would then hold any workers who refused
liable for damages or enjoin them from working.143 This is a harsh approach, 144 and

See, e.g., Sanford Jacoby, Labor in the Age of Finance: Pensions, Politics, and Corporations
from Deindustrialization to Dodd-Frank (2021); David Webber, The Rise of the Working-Class
Shareholder: Labor’s Last Best Weapon (2018).
141
Cf. Douglas G. Baird, Anthony J. Casey & Randal C. Picker, The Bankruptcy Partition, 166
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1675, 1694 (2018) (noting that a bankruptcy judge has the power to “designate” or
disqualify the votes of creditors that are cast in “bad faith,” i.e., to advance an interest outside of
their interest as creditors).
142
The investor would not be completely powerless without this ability, as they would remain
the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers and the employers would have a duty to
bargain in good faith. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). In the context of this scheme, these prohibitions would
prevent side deals between the workers and the employer that cut out the investor. But the duty to
bargain in good faith does not currently require the employer to make any particular substantive
concession. Id.
143
Permanent replacements hired by the employer would present different problems. In the
event of a strike called for economic reasons, the employer can hire replacement workers and is not
obligated to terminate the replacements when the strike ends. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Telegraph, 304 U.S. 333 (1938). Allowing the investor to rely on the ex ante deal to force permanent
replacements to join the strike would meaningfully alter the balance of power between labor and
management. A less extreme adjustment would be to allow the investor to bargain ex post with the
replacements and pay them to join the strike.
144
While this option would limit worker freedom, it is not clear that workers enjoy greater
freedom today. Suppose employer Alpha outsources a function and sends the workers performing
140
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it would raise concerns that should be addressed through additional regulation.
Workers should not sign over a right to pull them away from their jobs
unknowingly, or without adequate compensation. At a minimum, workers should
be told clearly about the potential risks and benefits of delegating the authority to
call a strike to the investor. A stronger rule would require an investor to
compensate workers while they are on strike, much as unions with healthy strike
funds do. The investor’s payments to workers would be recouped when it received
its share of the wage increases gained through the strike.
Second, an investor that prevailed in a certification election might be
required to then win the approval of a majority of workers in a strike-authorization
vote before calling a strike. While this would be challenging, it should not be
impossible if a strike is strategically advisable. Even if the investor takes 20% of
wage gains, the workers would retain 80% of wage gains; if the investor has a
strong argument that a strike would increase wages, workers would have an
incentive to agree.
Third, the investor might pay the workers for their agreement in the strikeauthorization vote. In this approach, the authorization process would provide a
forum for additional discussion and bargaining, in which the investor sought to
obtain the workers’ agreement using some combination of payments and persuasion
about the merits of the strike. This approach would preserve worker freedom, but
could cause an investor to reduce its initial bid. If the investor anticipates having to
pay workers to go on strike, it will pay less to win the certification election.
C.

Maintenance After the Initial Term

There would need to be a mechanism to preserve and build on the gains
achieved by the investor in its initial term as the exclusive bargaining
representative for a particular bargaining unit. As discussed above, set terms with
regular elections would help impose discipline.145
But after a first term by a for-profit investor, it may be difficult for the
system to operate without modification. Investors may not be willing to pay
workers for a stake in any wage gain over the next period. If there were gains to be

that function to a separate services-provider firm, Beta. Beta then requires the workers to sign
agreements that preclude them from working with one of Beta’s customers directly if they leave. At
that point, Beta controls whether the workers can do Alpha’s work. If the contract between Alpha
and Beta lapses, Beta can pull the workers away until a new and more favorable agreement is
reached. There are good reasons to be skeptical of both outsourcing and noncompete agreements,
but the steps do not seem like a radical departure from current practices. Here, the investor would
step into Beta’s role, and its financial incentive to increase the workers’ wages would mitigate some
of the concerns these practices normally raise.
145
See supra Part II.B.1.
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had, the initial investor presumably realized the majority of them during the initial
period.146
There are some potential solutions to the problem.
First, the system might allow an investor to take a larger share of any wage
gain. For example, suppose that the system operates using a 3-year term, and
permits investors to take 20% of wage gains over the initial term, but 40% of wage
gains over subsequent terms. An investor makes offers to workers and prevails in
an initial election in 2023, then obtains a $1.00 wage gain over the 2023-2026 term.
As a result, the investor claims $0.20 in revenue from its representation over the
2023-2026 term. The investor makes a second round of offers to workers and
prevails in the second election in 2026, then obtains a $0.50 wage gain over the
2026-2029 term. Due to its higher 40% share, the investor claims $0.20 in revenue
from its representation over the 2026-2029 term, even though it only obtained half
the wage gain. Because it would expect the same revenues, an investor would be
just as eager to bid for a second term as it was to bid for a first.
Second, the system might allow different forms of back end compensation
during the later terms. Instead of requiring a victorious investor to take a
percentage of wage gains, the system might allow investors to take a smaller
percentage of wages during later terms. For example, suppose that the investor
drove wages from $8.50 to $9.50 in its first term as exclusive bargaining
representative, so that the investor collected 20% of the $1.00 wage gain, or $0.20.
The investor might be allowed to take 2% of wages during the second term, so that
it would expect to make $0.20 again if it expected to drive wages to a $10.00 average
in the second term. As a result, investors would be willing to bid the same amount
for the second term as for the first.
This approach would substantially weaken the investor’s incentive to bargain
hard in the second and later terms: the investor would make $0.19 per worker hour
even if it achieved no improvements after the first term, as opposed to $0.20 if it
achieved a meaningful gain. But workers would, at that point, have experience
with the system, and would be able to weigh risks and benefits for themselves.
Of course, if the incentive problem was deemed intolerable, the system might
adopt a hybrid approach. In the asset management industry, a “2 and 20” fee
arrangement — in which managers get 2% of assets and 20% of gains in assets — is

Cf. Schwab, supra note __ at 386 (identifying reasons why taking over a unionized workplace
may be more attractive than organizing a workplace, including workers who are already accustomed
to the union process and who have appropriate expectations).
146
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typical. A similar structure would give investors a reason to stay present while also
providing an incentive to do real work to improve outcomes.
Third, the system could cede the space to traditional unions. Investors would
identify problems that could be quickly remedied, solve the problems during their
initial term, collect a return, then depart. If workers believed that collective
bargaining had been helpful, they would continue the practice through a traditional
nonprofit union funded by dues. If an investor believed that the union was not
representing the workers vigorously enough, or that there was room for further
gains, it could make another tender offer without special concessions.
This approach also has antecedents in equity markets. Index funds are
institutional investors that try to passively track the performance of a fixed index
like the S&P 500. Index funds cannot deliver outsized returns to savers or capture
the full benefits of governance improvements at firms, so they compete on costs. As
a result, they have an incentive to control costs by limiting their efforts at
monitoring the firms in their portfolio despite having a huge number of shares in
those firms.147 But other institutional investors are able to deliver outsized returns
and can use concentrated positions to capture more of the benefits of a governance
improvement. Such institutional investors can engage in “governance arbitrage”:
monitoring firms to find firms susceptible of improvement, taking a stake in those
firms, encouraging shareholders like index funds to vote for improvements, profiting
from those improvements, then departing.148 This approach works in equity
markets because the system there supports a diverse ecosystem of players with a
balance of objectives. The same might be true of a well-calibrated labor tender offer
market.

E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 2029 (2020).
148
See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863 (2013) (suggesting that
activist investors serve as “governance arbitrageurs” who find and solve problems, eliminating the
need for large index funds to monitor for those problems); Anna Christie, The Agency Costs of
Sustainable Capitalism, 55 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 875 (2021) (expanding the concept to sustainability
issues).
147
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Demand and Scale
A.

Potential Investors

To operate successfully, a labor tender offer market would need to attract a
robust set of investors. This section demonstrates that participating in a labor
tender offer market would be a natural extension of the current operating models of
activist funds, litigation funders, and traditional unions, with the goal of showing
that there is likely to be significant interest in the space.
1.

Activist Funds & Litigation Funders

Various players in the financial markets have cultivated competencies and
developed strategies that easily could be deployed in the labor tender offer market.
The success of shareholder activists and litigation financiers suggests the potential
of a labor tender offer business.
Shareholder activists take a concentrated position in a target company and
demand changes such as the return of capital or the sale of a business line.
Shareholder activism requires skill in identifying companies that are failing to
provide adequate returns to shareholders, overcoming the collective action problem
that normally prevents shareholders from asserting their interests, and pressuring
managers to give in to demands supported by shareholders. Those skills could
readily be adapted to support workers instead of shareholders.
Viewing this business model in a less favorable light, successful shareholder
activists are very effective pests who find points of vulnerability and squeeze. For
example, attempting to block a transaction sought by management is a common
strategy for extracting concessions, though its success depends on the legal context
and the bargaining power of the activist.149 The approach would readily map over
to the labor context, where leaders similarly seek pressure points and use shame to
advance a pro-worker agenda.150
Litigation financiers cover some portion of the cost of a civil lawsuit in
exchange for a portion of any recovery obtained in the litigation. The business
requires skill in identifying legal rights that could be more successfully asserted
with the additional resources provided by the litigation financier, determining the
financial value of those rights, and finding efficient ways to realize that value
See Edward B. Rock, Majority of the Minority Approval in a World of Active Shareholders, in
Law and Finance of Related Party Transactions 105 (Luca Enriques & Tobias H. Troger, eds. 2019)
(collecting and analyzing examples).
150
See, e.g., Justin Hicks, How A Beloved Giant Rat Won Free Speech Rights, NPR (Aug. 6,
2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/08/06/1024315097/how-a-beloved-giant-rat-won-free-speech-rights
(discussing the use of “Scabby,” a giant inflatable rat placed outside of sites of labor disputes to
shame employers).
149
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rapidly. Financing can empower one-off plaintiffs that would otherwise be
structurally disadvantaged in litigation by allying them with deep-pocketed repeat
players,151 and can create meaningful ex ante incentives for the powerful to obey the
law.152 These skills—and their impact on power dynamics and ex ante incentives—
would find ready application in a labor tender offer market.
There may also be direct overlaps in the business models, as litigation could
be an effective strategy for improving worker wages and increasing investor
payouts. Investors would have a direct incentive to challenge wage and hour
violations by employers, and could be given incentives to challenge other forms of
misconduct that harm workers.153 Investors in the labor tender offer space may
also find it valuable to challenge unfair labor practices by employers, or to bring
antitrust challenges to employer efforts to suppress wages. 154 Litigation financiers
cultivate the capacity to evaluate and manage such litigation, and could use that
capacity as players in a labor tender offer market.
Admittedly, part of the interest in investing in litigation finance stems from
the fact that its performance is not correlated with traditional financial products.
The value of a lawsuit against a company does not decline when the company’s
value declines, unless the decline is so severe that the company’s solvency comes
into question. The relationship between the value of labor representation rights
and a company’s value would be more complicated, as a decline in the health of the
business could make it difficult to wring additional wage gains out of
management.155 But they would represent a markedly different type of claim
against the cash flows of a company,

E.g., Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95
Minn. L. Rev. 1268, 1271 (2011) (“By aligning structurally weak social players who make infrequent
use of the courts (one-shotters) with powerful funders who make repeated use of the court system
(repeat players), litigation funding may alter the bargaining dynamics between the litigating parties
in favor of disempowered parties.”).
152
E.g., Suneal Bedi & William C. Marra, The Shadows of Litigation Finance, 74 Vand. L. Rev.
563 (2021) (litigation funding encourages the powerful to follow the law).
153
See supra Part II.B.2.
154
See Eric A. Posner, How Antitrust Failed Workers 34-44 (2021) (discussing “litigation gap” in
which cases challenging monopsony in labor markets are not brought as frequently as cases
challenging antitrust violations in product markets).
155
Of course, successfully asserting labor representation rights would decrease the value of a
company’s shares. See supra Part II.B.4.
151
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2.

Traditional Unions

Traditional unions could, theoretically, become active players in the labor
tender offer market. Indeed, unions would begin with the advantage of experience.
This background should help unions to negotiate wage increases where they prevail
in an election, and should help unions to estimate the appropriate dollar value for a
bid.
Unions would also have good reasons to make bids. Increasing collective
bargaining in the nonunion sector would help unions negotiate better deals in the
workplaces they already represent.156 Additional organizing would also increase
the political muscle of the labor movement, which could be valuable in obtaining
other reforms and changes. These forces have led major unions to devote resources
to high profile unionization campaigns.157 While a union’s outside interests might
pose other problems,158 they would create a meaningful incentive for unions to enter
the labor tender offer market.
Resources may prove to be more of a challenge. Pension funds may provide
one source of financial backing, as there is growing interest in using workers’ saved
capital to advance workers’ interests. 159 But until the labor tender offer market
matures and demonstrates robust financial returns, it may not be a suitable
investment for capital intended to support workers in their old age.

See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69
Chi. Kent L. Rev. 3, 13 (1993) (“unions could credibly promise unionized firms that they would, in
due course, organize all firms in the relevant product market, and hence ensure that any gains at the
bargaining table would be imposed on all competitors”); Petruska, supra note __ at 41-42 (collective
bargaining representative must “eliminate labor market competition in order to safeguard the union
scale,” either by unionizing entire industry or convincing non-union employers to abide by scale). A
representative would only be able to make this type of promise if a company’s competitors are also
subject to the regime — globalization would undermine the promise. Estreicher, Labor Law Reform,
supra note __ at 13.
157
For example, the Teamsters have sought to unionize Amazon and to challenge its expansion
plans. Julia Love, Amazon’s new union battle: Teamsters go local to snarl expansion, Reuters (Sep. 1,
2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/amazons-new-union-battle-teamsters-go-local-snarlexpansion-2021-09-01/ (describing Teamster efforts to encourage state and local governments to
constrain expansion and adopt antitrust regulation); Int’l B’hd of Teamsters, Teamsters Pass
Amazon Resolution (Jun. 24, 2021), https://teamster.org/2021/06/teamsters-pass-amazon-resolution/
(describing Teamsters decision to pursue comprehensive strategy to challenge Amazon).
158
Cf. supra Part II.B.4 (describing potential conflicts of interest for financial market
participants).
159
See, e.g., Sanford Jacoby, Labor in the Age of Finance: Pensions, Politics, and Corporations
from Deindustrialization to Dodd-Frank (2021); David Webber, The Rise of the Working-Class
Shareholder: Labor’s Last Best Weapon (2018).
156
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Potential Targets

A labor tender offer market would also require targets. The targets for
intervention are likely to evolve over time, as market participants gain experience,
demonstrate capacity, and attract resources. A natural starting point would be
individual, non-unionized workplaces. But as the market matured, investors would
be more likely to take on established unions or to attempt to obtain control over
labor across sectors or geographies.
1.

Non-Unionized Workplaces

Under the system, investors would only profit by rapidly driving wage gains
through collective bargaining. It would be natural to focus initially on workplaces
where wages had not yet been increased through prior attempts at collective
bargaining.
Investors would need to consider other issues. A workplace might be nonunionized because there is little to be gained from collective bargaining. For
example, if the relevant labor market is already highly competitive, employers may
already be paying wages that reflect the full value of worker contributions. Under
those circumstances, a successful effort to force wages upward could cause firms to
dial back production or exit the market.160 Investors would be more likely to drive
wages up in environments where employers had enjoyed some form of power over
workers, and had used that power to suppress wages. Investors might also focus on
larger workplaces, to obtain the benefits of scale.
2.

Unionized Workplaces

Investors may also decide to challenge existing unions that are not
adequately representing the workforce. Unionized workplaces may be attractive to
investors for a number of reasons. Unionization may reflect that workers have
some measure of power in the relevant labor market, and that power could be
converted into higher wages. Workers in a unionized workplace may also be more
familiar with collective bargaining, and better equipped to assist in efforts to
negotiate higher wages on their behalf.161
An investor would only attempt to challenge an existing union — and make
upfront payments to workers — if it believed that it could do better than the union.

Cf. Posner, How Antitrust Failed Workers, supra note __ at 133 (firms will exit if unions set
wages above the marginal revenue product of workers). Under certain conditions, the problem might
be overcome with creative compensation schemes that provided workers normal wages plus a cut of
profits.
161
But see Schwab, supra note __ at 386 (suggesting that unionized workplaces may be
particularly ripe targets because workers and employers are familiar with collective bargaining).
160
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If the union had already pushed wages as high as they could be pushed, an investor
would not be able to drive further wage gains, and would have no incentive to
displace the incumbent union.
Despite this limitation, there may be worthwhile opportunities for investors
to pursue. Investors may have unique strengths that they could bring to bear in a
negotiation,162 or have the resources to pursue strategies that would be out of reach
for a traditional union.163 Some unions may also be ineffective, corrupt, or captured
by the relevant employers, so that they fail to press as hard as a properly-motivated
investor would. That said, it may be difficult to identify such opportunities from the
outside, at least until investors have developed a track record of performance that
unions could be compared to.164
3.

Sectors

Ambitious investors might attempt to obtain control over broader swathes of
the workforce. By organizing all workers in a sector, an investor could dramatically
improve its bargaining position: It could promise each employer that its
competitors will not get a better deal.165 An investor that controls more of the
relevant pool of labor can also exert more monopoly power against employers, and
may be able to exert more political power.166 From the perspective of an investor,
these effects suggest potential returns to scale. 167 If the investor builds a large
enough business, it will be better positioned to increase worker wages and thus
obtain profits.
Naturally, unions are also aware of these benefits, and might also seek to
broaden their influence to attain them. But traditional unions have struggled to
organize individual workplaces on a piecemeal basis, and now largely seek to
change the legal landscape. 168 Such strategies may be a plausible strategy for

See supra Part III.A.1 (various Wall Street business models reward competencies that could
be brought to bear).
163
See infra Part III.B.3 (well-resourced investors could organize entire sectors or geographies
more easily than traditional unions relying on persuasion).
164
Cf. infra Part III.C (describing informational infrastructure required for a well-functioning
labor tender offer market).
165
See supra note __. The rules on conflicts of interest would have to permit this type of offer.
See supra Part II.B.4.
166
See Schwab, supra note __ at 385.
167
There may be other returns to scale, such as the ability to spread the cost of strikes over a
broader base. Id. An investor seeking to spread risk across its portfolio of workplaces would likely
seek to represent a different set of workers than an investor seeking to increase its bargaining
power. The former strategy would call for representation of a diverse set of different workplaces,
while the latter strategy would likely call for concentration within a particular labor market.
168
See Andrias, supra note __ at 58 (“Recognizing the futility of holding elections at McDonald’s
franchise stores on a one-off basis, the Fight for $15 has sought to define McDonald’s as the joint
162
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countering some forms of “fissuring,” in which companies hive off and outsource
various labor-intensive functions to legally distinct entities. 169 But they do not
provide a likely path to collective bargaining across competitors. 170 And even where
successful, this strategy is vulnerable to the sudden reversals in labor law that
attend transitions from one presidential administration to the next. 171
Relying on legal regime change also limits the flexibility and possibilities that
might be tapped through innovation. It is not clear what model of consolidation
would provide the best results: historically, some unions pursued a “trade” strategy
and sought to bargain on behalf of all workers with a particular skillset, while other
unions pursued an “industrial” strategy and sought to bargain on behalf of all
workers within a given industry.172 Representing a broad set of workers within a
particular locality might also be a useful strategy, particularly in countering
employers like Amazon that have an operational need for a large number of lowskilled workers in a wide range of locations across the country. Instead of adopting
legal rules that commit the labor movement to one particular model across the
economy, it may be preferable to allow private actors to innovate and experiment.
Of course, to achieve the scale required to pursue a sectoral strategy,
investors might have to win a large number of representation contests rapidly.
While traditional unions have struggled to achieve such victories, an investor using
the mechanisms described here may succeed. Building trust and credibility across
isolated workplaces is a challenging task for traditional organizing, 173 but may be
employer of all McDonald’s employees.”). This has not always been true across all industries. The
United Autoworkers “evolved into a national body which represents not only the employees of
General Motors, but also the employees of other auto manufacturers and of the many auto parts
firms, and, indeed, of businesses in a variety of unrelated industries.” Weiler, Governing the
Workplace, supra note __ at 188.
169
David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many and What Can
Be Done to Improve It (2017); Eric A. Posner, How Antitrust Failed Workers 133 (2021) (“Many
employers have taken advantage of legal forms that allow them to classify workers as independent
contractors . . . or fragment their workforce by operating through franchisees.”); Kate Andrias, The
New Labor Law, 126 Yale L.J. 2, 6 (2016) (“’fissured’ corporate structures were adopted by employers
in part to reduce labor costs and diminish the potency of the NLRA and employment law”).
170
For example, despite meaningful support from prominent Democrats, it seems unlikely that
the federal government will adopt the mechanisms that foreign governments have used to compel
sectoral bargaining. See Strine, Kovvali & Williams, supra note __ at __ (discussing German sectoral
bargaining rules and their limits).
171
E.g., Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., Joint Employer Status Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 85 FR 11184 (Feb. 26, 2020) (Trump-era rule reversing Obama-era labor-friendly decision on
standard for determining joint-employer status, which in turn reversed earlier standard).
172
Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note __ at 194-200 (discussing “trade” model of the
American Federation of Labor and “industrial” model of the Congress of Industrial Organizations).
173
See Posner, How Antitrust Failed Workers, supra note __ at 133 (“workers have become
increasingly isolated from each other as a result of broad economic trends, and this isolation
interferes with organization”).
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easier for investors that can use hard cash to bridge the gap. Investors attempting
a large scale organization could also limit the financial risk to themselves with
appropriate conditions on their bids. For example, an investor could make its
payment to workers contingent on organizing a sufficient number of employers.
C.

Infrastructure Needed for Scale

To function effectively, a labor tender offer market would require a robust
ecosystem in which players like journalists, analysts, and advisory services
generate information and analysis that benefits investors and workers. Without
such an ecosystem, workers would struggle to evaluate offers and investors would
struggle to identify profitable opportunities.
Analogies to corporate law and securities markets are instructive. As one of
us has observed, shareholders are not asked to make voting decisions in a vacuum:
shareholders can rely on recommendations by proxy advisory services like Glass
Lewis and ISS.174 And shareholders are not asked to make trading decisions in a
vacuum: shareholders of major public corporations can generally rely on
informationally efficient markets, in which mechanisms like mandatory disclosure,
analyst coverage, trading by a small set of well-informed actors, and trading by a
large set of less-informed actors cause share prices to reflect all available
information about corporate prospects. 175 Workers and investors in the labor tender
offer market are likely to make better decisions if they receive an equivalent level of
support.
The existence of a labor tender offer market would help foster the
development of such an ecosystem by putting real money at play. There would be
actual profit potential in identifying oppressed workers or effective labor
investment firms. Money chasing those opportunities would also support reporting
and analysis. Journalists already appear to take interest in labor issues, and labor
tender offer activity would create opportunities for new sorts of coverage of labor
issues.
Markets for bargaining representation could be supported by appropriate
disclosure requirements for corporations. The government could require companies
to disclose information relevant to assessing labor market power, ideally at private
as well as public companies, and ideally with sufficient granularity to identify
specific bargaining units that could feasibly be organized. Even apart from their

Macey, supra note __ at 344-50.
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va.
L. Rev. 549 (1984); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286 (D.N.J. 1989) (identifying factors
suggesting efficient market for a company’s shares, including active trading market, analyst
coverage, and numerous market makers).
174
175
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value to this scheme — helping investors to identify targets — such disclosures
would have other potential benefits to workers and to society more generally. 176
And if the labor tender offer market grew into a real threat to corporate
profitability, some portion of such disclosures would likely be necessary for public
companies. Without it, shareholders would be unable to assess the risks associated
with a company’s approach to employees.177
IV.

Broader Questions and Implications
A.

Policy Arbitrage

The tender offer proposal suggests the potential of a broader “policy
arbitrage” approach, in which the mechanisms and insights of corporate law are
mined for opportunities to improve labor law. 178 Corporate law has proven both
dynamic and effective in advancing its stated goal of delivering financial returns to
shareholders. It would be valuable to impart these virtues to labor law, which has
been perceived as ossified and ineffective in addressing the needs of workers. 179
The work has already begun. One of us has previously offered proposals for
reducing agency costs within unions that were drawn from mechanisms used to
control agency costs within corporations.180 Other scholars have generated
provocative proposals to help the labor movement by tapping corporate law insights
about private ordering or securities disclosure. 181
Continued study is likely to suggest additional opportunities. Corporate law
and labor law are both designed to coordinate economic activity and allocate power.
Experiences in one field are likely to prove useful to the other. Corporate law

See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 Stan. L.
Rev. 351 (2011); Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory
Stakeholder Disclosure, 37 Yale J. on Reg. 499 (2020).
177
Indeed, there have already been thoughtful calls for enhanced reporting on human capital
issues, along with enhanced board processes. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Kirby M. Smith & Reilly S.
Steel, Caremark and ESG, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach to Implementing an Integrated,
Efficient, and Effective Caremark and EESG Strategy, 106 Iowa L. Rev. 1885 (2021) (discussing an
integrated approach to disclosing and managing risks associated with employee, environmental,
social, and governance issues). New rules on “Human Capital Management Disclosure” are
currently on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s regulatory agenda.
178
See Macey, supra note __ at 315. The concept also has some similarities with the concept of a
“legal transplant,” in which legal rules are moved from one nation’s system to another. See Alan
Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (1974).
179
E.g. Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1527
(2002).
180
See Macey, supra note __; supra Part I.A.
181
See Estreicher, supra note __; Bodie, supra note __.
176
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scholars are increasingly focused on worker issues, 182 and advocates for workers are
increasingly focused on corporate law tools.183 At a minimum, there is clear value
in greater scholarly dialogue between the two fields.
B.

Solidarity and Voting Versus Market

While promising, the policy arbitrage approach advanced here does raise a
fundamental question about the nature and objectives of labor law. It is plainly
consistent with a vision of labor law as a vehicle for improving economic outcomes
for workers.184 But that is not the only potential conception of labor law’s purpose.
Labor law could be understood as an effort to inject democratic processes and values
into everyday working life, in the hope of increasing the dignity and agency of
working people and enriching political democracy. 185 It could also be understood as
an effort to support political movements based on worker solidarity. 186 Marketbased approaches drawn from corporate practice are unlikely to be helpful on these
fronts, and could easily prove destructive. 187 While a labor tender offer market
would recruit big-pocketed allies, it would necessarily promote worker solidarity or
See, e.g., George S. Georgiev, The Human Capital Management Movement in U.S. Corporate
Law, 95 Tulane L. Rev. 639 (2021). Many suggestions made by corporate law scholars also raise real
questions under labor law: structures intended to give workers voice within a company may violate
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, which is intended to prevent companies from
coopting labor representatives by forming company unions. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2); Strine,
Kovvali, Williams, supra note __ (noting that American labor law adopts an adversarial approach
that may preclude works councils and other structures that are common abroad).
183
See, e.g., Webber, supra note __ (describing how unions have used their power as
shareholders to advance the interests of workers).
184
See Estreicher, supra note __ at 510 (“A union is a limited-purpose organization that, when it
works as it should, advances the membership’s economic goals; it is not for most members a vehicle
for realizing their noneconomic, spiritual needs.”).
185
This democracy-advancing goal has frequently been cited in support of proposals to give
employees greater governance rights at work. See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie,
Reconstructing the Corporation 177-78 (2020) (The German system of allowing workers to elect
representatives to the board of directors “is viewed less in terms of an economic system than as one
designed to promote a well-functioning democracy and help prevent social division – in particular,
the division between labor and capital. And, on this broad level, it is thought to be broadly
successful.”); Brett McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work,
13 Stanford J. of L., Bus. & Fin. 334, 369 (2008) (“The hope is that employee primacy can create both
skills and values that support greater democracy in the political world”).
186
E.g., Michael M. Oswalt, Alt-Bargaining, 82 L. & Contem. Problems 89 (2019) (suggesting
that union campaigns can serve as a locus for community organizing); Andrias, supra note __ at 8488 (describing role of labor unions in “social bargaining” systems that enlist political support);
Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 Yale L.J. 148
(2013); Michael J. Goldberg, Derailing Union Democracy: Why Deregulation Would Be a Mistake, 23
Berk. J. Emp. & Lab. L. 137, 143 (2002) (“Economists’ models may portray unions as purely
economic actors and nothing more, but political scientists and sociologists recognize that unions play
a much broader role in our society.”).
187
Cf. Schwab, supra note __ at 403 (right to sell union membership would undermine solidarity
values).
182
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mobilize workers in an ideological sense or promote democratic values. The labor
tender offer proposal thus forces a confrontation between these two models of labor
law.188
Ideally, workers would decide for themselves which approach works best for
themselves. If workers themselves (as opposed to their fans in the academy)
actually do care about democracy or solidarity, traditional unions that offer those
benefits will have a competitive advantage vis-à-vis investors that merely offer
money for the right to represent them. Financial investors will prevail if and only if
they can offer economic benefits that workers find more valuable than the bundle of
economic and moral benefits that some people attribute to traditional unions.
Evidence on worker preferences is somewhat mixed. Significantly, workers
historically have supported union leaders who were arguably corrupt or
authoritarian because those leaders delivered meaningful economic benefits. 189
Workers today, however, are increasingly eager to have their work reflect their
moral values.190 Allowing the market to value moral benefits offers one potential
resolution to the impasse, and would avoid a one-size-fits-all prescription.
The market-based answer is not without serious drawbacks. First, there may
be externalities to the decision. Helping a worker to become an empowered and
engaged citizen helps the entire community, not just the worker. 191 A worker will
thus undervalue the moral benefits of a traditional approach to labor law, and may
agree to investor offers that are socially destructive. Second, collective action
problems tend to put moral benefits at a disadvantage when decisions are based on
market transactions instead of traditional voting. Except in a very small
workplace, a given worker is unlikely to make the difference between acceptance or
rejection of a union or investor. As a result, the worker would have no reason to act
on a preference for traditional representation when offered cash by an investor, and
no reason not to act on that preference when offered a free choice in a traditional
election.192

Cf. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 Cardozo
L. Rev. 261 (1992) (describing similar confrontation in corporate law).
189
See Estreicher, Deregulating, supra note __ at __ (noting that union members consistently
backed authoritarian leaders like Hoffa and Bevona because they obtained favorable economic terms
in collective bargaining agreements); Petruska, supra note __ at 26 (same).
190
See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for
Altruism, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 571, 578 & nn. 28-29 (2009) (firms perceived as being ethical generate
goodwill with employees and have a recruiting advantage).
191
McDonnell, supra note __ at 374-79 (identifying externalities that affect value and adoption
of employee-empowering governance models).
192
Cf. Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not
Market Value, 2 J.L. Fin. & Acct. 247 (2017). The basic intuition is that an individual is not likely to
make the difference in either a tender offer or a proxy fight. As a result, the individual has no
188
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A better answer is that democracy and solidarity are not really options for
private sector workers today. Perhaps in the specific situation of an investor
challenging a traditional union,193 there would be troubling issues to resolve about
the choice between democracy and market transactions. But with private sector
unionization rates currently at about 6%, the concern is not central to the lives of
modern workers.
There are also real benefits to focusing exclusively on a narrow set of
economic interests. An analogy to corporate law is again instructive. There had
been a longstanding debate about whether corporations should focus exclusively on
delivering financial returns to shareholders or should balance shareholder returns
against a broader set of social concerns. 194 These views enjoyed an uneasy
coexistence until the rise of tender offers forced a confrontation and a relentless
focus on shareholder returns. 195 Whatever its flaws, the resulting system has
clearly delivered substantial financial returns to shareholders. Given the
economically enfeebled state of American workers, a similarly monomaniacal focus
on their financial wellbeing would be appropriate.
Alternative understandings are also fraught with peril. If unions are
understood as political organizations, it becomes reasonable to adopt stringent
regulations to ensure that they genuinely command majority support among
workers196 and do not limit the rights of workers who disagree. 197 If they are

incentive to resist an economically favorable tender offer on moral grounds (their tender won’t affect
the outcome, so why not make a quick buck), or to compromise their morals by voting for an
economically favorable scheme (their vote won’t affect the outcome, so why not vote to do the right
thing).
193
See supra Part III.B.2.
194
See, e.g., William D. Savitt & Aneil Kovvali, On the Promise of Stakeholder Governance: A
Response to Bebchuk & Tallarita, 106 Cornell L. Rev. 1881 (2021) (arguing for consideration of a
broader set of concerns); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 23
(1991) (arguing for focus on shareholders). The labor tender offer proposal should have a similarly
clarifying effect.
195
E.g. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 Cardozo
L. Rev. 261 (1992).
196
Cf. Weiler, Governing the Workplace, supra note __ at 257 (calling out assumption that
“since certification confers on the trade union a quasi-governmental authority over the employees,
we must have an election procedure comparable to the one by which our political governors are
chosen”). This view shades naturally into support for secret ballots and opposition to card-check
procedures urged by unions. The analogy to democracy may have led to other problems within labor
law. See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal
Labor Law, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 495 (1993) (suggesting that a flawed analogy to political democracy has
led to procedures that incorporate employers in the certification process).
197
See Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (First Amendment bars public sector unions
from requiring non-members to pay dues); Tom Campbell, Exclusive Representation in Public and
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instead understood as vehicles for achieving a narrow set of economic goals, this
type of ideological regulation would be more difficult to justify. The labor
movement’s choice of a political path may well have left it open to unfavorable
government interventions.
Diminishing the role of elections might also raise a separate set of economic
concerns. Union elections are supposed to be conducted under “laboratory
conditions.”198 Regulators are sensitive when a worker is offered inducements to
take a public stance during a certification election, out of a concern that the
worker’s “outward manifestation of support must often serve as a campaign tool . . .
to convince other employees . . . , if only because many employees respect their
coworkers’ views on the unionization issue. [Permitting inducements would allow
the employer or] the union to buy endorsements and paint a false portrait of
employee support during its election campaign.”199 In other words, allowing market
mechanisms like payments could move outcomes away from the undistorted
preferences of workers, because workers count on each other to advance common
interests.
In corporate law, very similar concerns once led courts to prohibit vote
buying. Each shareholder was believed to be entitled to every other shareholder’s
independent judgment of how best to advance the common goal of maximizing the
value of the firm. A payment buying the vote of an influential shareholder thus
operated as a form of deceit on other shareholders. 200 But the logic, and eventually
the rule, collapsed as financial markets developed. 201 Shareholders are dispersed
and have a broad range of interests. No shareholder can reasonably assume that
another’s voting decisions are motivated by a common goal. Because there is no
falsity, payments cannot move outcomes away from undistorted preferences.
The corporate law trend is worth considering in the labor space. Though
labor organizers might prefer otherwise, workers do have their own interests
independent of the workplace. Many of the developments in the labor market that
have made organizing difficult — including fissuring in the workplace and high
turnover in jobs — have reduced the extent to which a worker can reasonably rely
on each other to make mutually beneficial decisions. A tender offer market for labor
representation would also operate transparently, without the falsity that has driven
objections to vote buying or other inducements.

Private Labor Law after Janus, 70 Syracuse L. Rev. 731 (2020) (proposing to extend Janus to
eliminate concept of unions serving as exclusive bargaining representative for workers in a unit).
198
See supra note __ (collecting sources).
199
NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 277 (1973).
200
See Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 24 (Del. Ch. 1982) (collecting and discussing cases).
201
Id. at 25; 8 Del C. 218(c).
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C.

Completing Markets

A labor tender offer market would offer investors a new form of claim on the
cash flows of a firm, and would offer workers new opportunities to tap and diversify
the value of their human capital. Investors in capital markets are already eagerly
seeking new avenues for investment that can help diversify away risks. 202 A new
asset class with different correlations and sensitivities would help in this effort, and
could help markets reach more efficient outcomes.
The potential benefits for workers are even more striking. Workers have a
large portion of their wealth, and a large measure of their sense of self-worth, tied
up in their jobs. Because they are currently unable to diversify away the risks
associated with this human capital, and have extremely limited options for insuring
this asset or immediately tapping its value, workers are inevitably risk averse. 203
This risk-aversion has direct consequences for labor organizing, as workers are
rationally reluctant to trust their careers to unions that have not yet demonstrated
capacity and credibility. And it has implications for corporate governance, as
workers are rationally reluctant to make firm-specific investments in their human
capital without meaningful assurances that those investments will not be lost to
opportunistic employers.204
The labor tender offer market that we propose in this Article would change
the calculus. By accepting a tender offer, a worker would have a way to capture,
quickly and immediately, a meaningful portion of the value of any firm-specific
investments she has made. By investing that money in schemes at other
companies, or in education for herself or her family, the worker would be able to
diversify her human capital. In theory, this should make workers more willing to
make valuable investments in themselves and more tolerant of risk.
Conclusion
The approach that we have taken in this Article reflects the potential benefits
of “policy arbitrage” between corporate law and labor law. By tapping into the
See supra Part III.A.1.
Cf. Jens Damann & Horst Eidenmueller, Codetermination: A Poor Fit For U.S. Corporations,
2020 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 870, 932-34 (“Employees . . . cannot protect themselves against firmspecific risks easily.”); Schwab, supra note __ at 383 (“Union members . . . depend on one set of
leaders to represent them in the workplace. They cannot diversify into several jobs, but are stuck in
one.”); Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital Markets and
Corporate Law, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1061, 1067-68 (1984) (“Human capital, unlike capital investments
in particular firms, is notoriously difficult to diversify. . . . Relative inability is relevant . . . for riskaverse workers whose firm-specific investments of human capital constitute a large percentage of
their wealth.”).
204
Cf. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va.
L. Rev. 247 (1999).
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mechanisms that have made corporations powerful tools for directing wealth toward
shareholders, the approach seeks to make labor representation a more powerful tool
for directing wealth toward workers. Some scholars already have generated
provocative proposals to help the labor movement by tapping insights about
corporate governance, private ordering, or securities disclosure. 205 This Article taps
insights about the market for corporate control to offer a mechanism that could
deliver immediate payments to workers, draw new resources into the work of labor
organizing, and improve the quality of labor representation.

205

See Macey, supra, note __; Estreicher, supra note __; Bodie, supra note __.
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